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FOREWORD
It is nearly 15 years since biological weapons (BW) have become a
signiﬁcant national security preoccupation. This occurred primarily
due to four circumstances, all of which occurred within a short span of
years. The ﬁrst, beginning around 1990 and repeated many times in the
years that followed, was the ofﬁcial U.S. Government suggestion that
proliferation of offensive BW programs among states and even “nonstate
actors”—terrorist groups—was an increasing trend. The second was
the discovery, between 1989 and 1992, that the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) had violated the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC) since its ratiﬁcation in 1975 and had built a massive covert
biological weapons program, the largest the world had ever seen. The
third was the corroboration by the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) in 1995 that Iraq had maintained a covert biological weapons
program since 1974, and had produced and stockpiled large quantities
of agents and delivery systems between 1988 and 1991. The last was the
discovery, also in 1995, that the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group, which
had carried out the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system, also
had spent 4 years attempting—albeit unsuccessfully—to produce and
disperse two pathogenic biological agents.
The events of September 11, 2001, although not in any way related
to BW, combined with the distribution of professionally prepared
anthrax spores through the U.S. postal system in the weeks afterwards,
magniﬁed previous concerns by orders of magnitude. In December 2002,
after U.S. forces had overrun much of the territory of Afghanistan, it was
discovered that the al-Qaida organization also had spent several years
trying to obtain the knowledge and means to produce biological agents.
These new factors shifted the context in which BW was considered
almost entirely to “bioterrorism.” Within 4 years, almost $30 billion in
federal expenditure was appropriated to counter the anticipated threat.
This response took place in the absence of virtually any threat analysis.
The purpose of this monograph is to begin to ﬁll that gap.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
v

SUMMARY
This monograph is comprised of six substantive sections. An
opening introductory section sets the global context in which the
threat of “bioterrorism” should be placed. It brieﬂy surveys other
nonmilitary challenges to national and global security that the United
States and other nations currently face, and will face in the coming
decades. It does so, where possible, by including the mortality levels
currently resulting from these factors, particularly natural disease
agents, and the levels that can be projected for them. This provides
a comparative framework within which bioterrorism can more
properly be assessed.
The second section, using U.S. Government sources, surveys
the evolution of offensive state biological weapons programs. This
demonstrates that ofﬁcial estimates of the number of such programs
have diminished by between one-fourth and one-third, from a
peak of some 13 nations in mid-2001. What is known regarding any
proliferation from these programs is also surveyed, as well as state
assistance to nonstate actors.
The third section surveys the evolution of the efforts by nonstate
actors—terrorist groups—to obtain, develop, and use biological
agents. The survey covers the entire 20th century, and up to the present
day, focusing on the last 25 years. The efforts by the two groups which
involved the most serious attempts to produce biological agents, the
Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group between 1990-94 and the al-Qaida
organization in Afghanistan between 1997-98 and December 2001,
are reviewed in detail. Using information provided by declassiﬁed
documents, as well as information from other sources, this section
provides as detailed an examination as is available of the BW efforts
of the al-Qaida organization.
The Japanese Aum group did not succeed in obtaining virulent
strains of pathogens, nor was it apparently capable of working
successfully with the strains that it did have. The al-Qaida group
also appears not to have been able to obtain pathogens, nor to have
reached the stage of laboratory work by the time U.S. military forces
occupied Afghanistan.
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As the most signiﬁcant examples available, these highlight all the
more the unique character of the anthrax postal mailings in the fall
of 2001 in the United States. The quality of the material that was
distributed demonstrates the dangerous possibilities that could be
achieved. However, until the perpetrator is identiﬁed, and unless
it becomes possible to exclude any links with the U.S. biodefense
program, it remains impossible to assess the relevance of this event
as an indicator of what might be expected from international terrorist
organizations.
The fourth section reviews the public portrayal of the BW
threat by U.S. ofﬁcials. It includes a review of ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial
exercise scenarios that have been carried out in the past half-dozen
years, as well as recommended planning scenarios proposed by U.S.
Government agencies. It includes a very detailed examination of
several of these scenarios. Many of the exercises are predicated on
the repeated use of the aerosolized pathogens which produce plague
and smallpox. These pathogens are not easy to obtain, and they are
relatively difﬁcult to work with. Producing aerosolized formulations
of them is far beyond the current or near-term capabilities of any
identiﬁed international terrorist group.
The ﬁfth and ﬁnal section discusses the impact of the U.S.
biodefense research program on the possible future development
of biological weapons. A signiﬁcant issue is the interaction of
constraints and limitations imposed by the terms of the Biological
Weapons Convention, an international treaty which the U.S.
Government was instrumental in bringing about, and the greatly
expanded U.S. biodefense research program already in progress and
set out in planning documents for the near future. The current lack of
departmental and government-wide oversight over these programs
is noted.
The monograph ends with a brief section of conclusions, including
policy recommendations.
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PART I
INTRODUCTION
Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,
on January 27, 2005, U.S. Senate Majority Leader William Frist stated
that “The greatest existential threat we have in the world today is
biological.” He added the prediction that “an inevitable bio-terror
attack” would come “at some time in the next 10 years.”1 He was
seconded by Dr. Tara O’Toole, head of the Center for Biosecurity at
the University of Pittsburgh: “This [bioterrorism] is one of the most
pressing problems we have on the planet today.”2
Are these statements realistic?
Are they even proximately realistic?
By way of the most cursory comparison, one can set potential
bioterrorism against:
• Global climate change, which could affect populations in every
corner of the globe, alter the current growth cycles of food
crops that have evolved over millennia, and consequently
food production;3
• Ocean quality deterioration, deforestation, desertiﬁcation,
depletion of fresh-water aquifers—all of these are also global
in impact;4
• The complex of global population growth, food production,
energy and other resource constraints, and the waste
products—solid, liquid and gaseous—produced by human
society and the impact of these on regional and global
ecosystems;
• Between 224.5 and 236 million people died in the 20th century
in wars and conﬂict—say, roughly 230 million.5 This early in
the 21st century, it is impossible to say whether the harvest of
conﬂict-related deaths will be any different in the 21st century
than it was in the 20th century.
• If one adds deaths due to poverty, the ﬁgures become
astronomical. Jeffrey Sachs currently estimates this sum
1

worldwide at 20,000 people per day, or 7.3 million per year,
approximately 75 million over a 10-year period.6 Some portion
of the deaths that Sachs counts may be due to treatable disease:
these are discussed separately below.
• A working group convened by the Strategic Assessments
Group of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
RAND Corporation in September 2004 listed 10 “future
national security threats . . . to the United States” looking
ahead to 2020. Of the 10, one was “proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD)” and a second was “new health
threats, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).”
There was no mention of the use of biological weapons by a
terrorist group.7
• Turning to the 1999 Millennium Project list of “The 15 Global
Challenges We Face at the Millennium,” only 1 of the 15 dealt
with disease agents: “What can be done to reduce the threat of
new and reemerging diseases, and the increasing number of
immune micro-organisms.” It did not include consideration
of “bio-terrorism” at all.8
• No attempt is made in this monograph to draw parallels—
or to attempt a comparison of relative risk or potential
consequences—between the prospect of “bioterrorism” and
cyberterrorism.9 This is despite the fact that hundreds of
attacks on U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) computers
and on national infrastructure targets take place every day
of the year, and that numerous successful penetrations have
occurred. Available data a full decade ago indicated that as
many as 250,000 attacks on DoD computers took place in
1995. A 1996 Government Accountability ofﬁce (GAO) report
characterized 65 percent of them as “successful.”10
• Within a 10-day period between April 6 and April 16, 2005, no
fewer than ﬁve other competitors were announced as being
the most dire threat faced by nations:
—

nuclear terrorism;11

—

640 million small arms and light weapons around the
world, which are responsible for an estimated 300,000
deaths per year;12
2

—

a terrorist attack using high explosives aimed at cooling
ponds holding stored irradiated nuclear reactor rods
at civil nuclear power plants, leading to reactor core
meltdown and radiation release analogous to the
Chernobyl reactor disaster;13

—

the possibility of impact of an asteroid with the earth;14
and

—

a missile attack that would detonate a nuclear explosive
over the United States producing an Electromagnetic
Pulse (EMP) “. . . that could come not only from terrorist
organizations like al Queda but from rogue nations such
as Iran or North Korea.”15

To complete the picture, Rogelio Pﬁrter, Director General of the
United Nations Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, stated, perhaps unsurprisingly, that “. . . chemical terrorism has
been identiﬁed in different regions of the world as the number one
potential threat.”16
If one looks only at disease and other human public health
concerns, we see the following:
• Three diseases alone—malaria, tuberculosis, and human
immuno-deﬁciency virus/acquired immune deﬁciency
syndrome (HIV/AIDS)—kill 5 million people globally year in,
year out. In 2004, that sum reportedly reached 6 million.17 In 1
decade, that is 50 million dead. And although the contribution
of HIV/AIDS to this sum is more recent, the overall total
has apparently been roughly the same for many years past.
Projected HIV/AIDS mortality estimates are available for
the decade to come, and will very likely produce another 50
million dead due to these three diseases. Falciparium malaria
is estimated to currently infect 515 million people worldwide,
with 2.2 billion people—one out of every three people in the
world—at risk of infection. The cost of malaria to the economy
of African nations alone is estimated at $12 billion per year.18
Malaria is preventable or treatable. Tuberculosis currently
infects nearly 1 billion people, and 1 billion new cases are
anticipated by 2020, 35 million of whom will die.
3

The direct impact on the United States of global infectious disease
was recognized by the U.S. Government in 1996 by the establishment
of “. . . a national policy to address the threat of emerging infectious
diseases through improved domestic and international surveillance,
prevention, and response measures,” and a standing Task Force in
the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) to coordinate
those efforts,19 and by a January 2000 National Intelligence Estimate
titled The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the
United States.20
• Diarrheal diseases kill 3.5 million people per year. Most are
preventable. The number can be considered more or less
constant over many years, and would mean roughly 35 million
dead over a period of 10 years.21
• When the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control—a
global anti-tobacco treaty—came into effect on February 27,
2005, World Health Organization (WHO) authorities stated
that smoking kills 13,500 people per day, or 5 million people
per year.22 That is another 50 million people every 10 years.
The world has an estimated 1.2 billion smokers, and notably
the United States (and China) are among the treaty signatories
that have, however, not ratiﬁed it. In this sum are 500,000
deaths per year due to smoking in European Union (EU)
countries, and probably an additional half to two-thirds that
number in Russia.
• On March 4, 2005, WHO announced that measles mortality
had dropped from 873,000 in 1999 to 530,000 in 2003.23 That
amounts to 3.6 million dead in the past 5 years. As measles
mortality was over 1 million children alone per year “as
recently as a decade ago,” that would mean around 10 million
for the decade 1989 to 1999, and the same for preceding
decades. (In early 2005, the nongovernmental organization
(NGO) Doctors Without Borders, claimed that measles was
still “killing nearly a million children every year.”)24 Almost
all nonimmune children will contract measles if exposed to
the virus. The measles vaccine has been available for 40 years.
Immunization costs U.S. $0.30 per vaccination.
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• Between the 22 years from 1977 to 1999, ﬂu killed 788,000
people in the United States, an average of 36,000 people per
year.25 Even if there is no outbreak of pandemic ﬂu, one can
project another 360,000 ﬂu-related deaths in the United States
alone in the coming decade.
Number of ﬂu-related deaths
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97

Figure 1.
• WHO ofﬁcials have been warning for years of the imminence
of a pandemic ﬂu outbreak. They have warned that the
pandemic was “almost inevitable,” and long overdue.26 There
were three inﬂuenza pandemics in the 20th century. The worst
was the 1918-19 “Spanish ﬂu.” Estimates of the mortality it
caused range from a low of 20 million to higher estimates of
over 50 million worldwide and even 100 million.27 The Asian
ﬂu of 1957-58 killed about 1 million people globally, while
the third ﬂu pandemic, the 1968-79 Hong Kong ﬂu, killed an
estimated 1-4 million people.28
Flu pandemics usually occur about every 20 to 30 years, and it has
now been 40 years since the last one. The H5N1 avian ﬂu strain, which
ﬁrst appeared in the 1997 Hong Kong outbreak, is still believed to
be generally incapable of person-to-person transmission. Until very
recently, the human lethality of the H5N1 strain was considered to
be approximately 50 percent of those infected. However, it is now
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understood that the actual incidence of infection is substantially
higher, due to cases that produce atypical symptoms or do not show
any symptoms at all, as well as because of underreporting from
affected countries such as Laos, Cambodia, and China.29 While this
happily means that lethality is actually lower than 50 percent, it also
means that the chance of recombination to a human-transmissible
variant is very much higher, since a much larger population is being
infected.
What has been feared for the past half-dozen years is the
recombination of the H5N1 avian ﬂu in a person or animal
simultaneously infected with a human ﬂu strain, so that the
recombinant would acquire the ability to be spread from person to
person. Such a recombinant strain would display the lethality of the
strain that caused the 1918 to 1921 ﬂu pandemic which killed tens of
millions worldwide. On February 23, 2005, the WHO Asia Director
stated that “The world is now in the gravest possible danger of a
pandemic.”30 Dr. Julie Gerberding, head of the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, told a meeting of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science 2 days earlier that avian
ﬂu poses the single biggest threat to the world at present, the “most
important threat that we are facing right now.”31 Even Dr. Anthony
Fauci, Director of the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious
Diseases, has ﬁnally discovered the seriousness of pandemic ﬂu. Dr.
Fauci, who in recent years made bioterrorism his main preoccupation
and the subject of many public statements, acknowledged on
February 28, 2005, that “the possibility of an inﬂuenza pandemic . . .
is a greater threat today than bioterrorism.”32 On March 21, 2005, Dr.
Fauci presented the keynote address at the 2005 Bio Defense Research
Meeting of the American Society for Microbiology. His address was
titled “Inﬂuenza and Bird Flu: The Ultimate Threats.”33
At the end of May 2005, Dr. Peter Cordingly, the WHO Regional
Coordinator for Asia, stated that analyses of ﬂu transmission in the
preceding months had led to “strong suspicions that person-to-person
transmission had taken place in two foci, one in Vietnam and one in
Thailand,” and possibly a third in Cambodia. The H5N1 strain was
continuing to evolve. “It’s learning to live in the human house, and
that is potentially very worrying.” The fatality rate also continues to
drop, and there is conﬁrmed evidence of asymptomatic infection.34
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Cordingly added that on the basis of the timeline demonstrated in
the 1957-58 outbreak, the pandemic could begin within 6 months
of demonstration of sustained person-to-person transmission.35 In
recent Senate testimony, Dr. Craig Venter suggested that “outbreaks
and spread of avian and other ﬂu virus strains . . . could potentially
kill hundreds of millions and wreak havoc with our global health
system.”36 Dr. Venter may have had advance notice of the report of the
Global Task Force for Inﬂuenza, which appeared in the May 26, 2005,
issue of Nature. This report predicted that 20 percent of the world’s
population would be infected in a ﬂu pandemic, but estimated that
perhaps only 7.5 million people would die.37 Writing in the special
issue of Foreign Affairs in the summer of 2005, Dr. Michael Osterholm
extrapolated estimates of the 1917-18 pandemic ﬂu mortality to the
current world population and arrived at 180 to 360 million deaths.38
However, the U.S. Fiscal Year 2006 budget is to provide $4.2 billion
to the Department of Health and Human Services for biodefense
programs, $1.76 billion of which will go to NIH for biodefense
research. At the same time, NIH will only be spending $120 million—
less than one-tenth as much—for work on inﬂuenza.39 Imagine, in
the current climate, what the reaction of the U.S. Administration,
Congress, the media, and bioterrorism publicists would be if an
agency were predicting with near certainty that “bioterrorists”
were “about to launch a biological weapons attack that would kill
somewhere between 10 and 100 million people, perhaps more.”40
• On March 1, 2005, 758 microbiologists sent an open letter
to NIH Director Elias Zerhouni criticizing NIH expenditure
priorities which greatly favored research grant funds for the
“select agent” pathogens of particular interest to biodefense.
The supplementary materials that accompanied the letter
included a brief discussion of the spread of antibiotic resistance
to major human pathogens:
The 2003 National Academy of Sciences report “Microbial Threats
to Health” warned that “The world is facing an imminent crisis
in the control of infectious diseases as the result of a gradual but
steady increase in the resistance of a number of microbial agents
to available therapeutic drugs,” and recommended that “The
U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure
the formulation and implementation of a national strategy for
developing new antimicrobials.”
7

These threats are posed by bacterial agents now established in
human populations. Tuberculosis is in global resurgence. The
World Health Organization projects that there will be more
than 10 million new cases of tuberculosis in 2005 and that
there will be nearly 1 billion new infected people by 2020, 200
million of whom will become seriously ill, and 35 million of
whom will die. Additional threats are posed by other bacterial
agents, including the agents responsible for salmonellosis,
shigellosis, borreliosis, legionellosis, ehrlichiosis, pertussis,
syphilis, gonorrhea, chlamydia, meningococcal infections,
and staphylococcal infections. For each of these agents, strains
resistant to multiple current antibiotics have emerged, and
strains resistant to all current antibiotics have emerged or are
expected soon to emerge.41

In all of the above, which has been by way of introduction, two
groups of global problems faced by humankind are listed. The second
group enumerates only a few pathogen and public-health problems,
with an annual mortality of above 11 million people per year. So,
is bioterrorism “the greatest existential threat we have in the world
today”? And is it “one of the most pressing problems we have on the
planet today”?
No. Absolutely not. That is clearly demonstrated by the above
examples.
A 2003 report for the Century Foundation nevertheless noted, that
the 2001 “Amerithrax” events demonstrated that “. . . bioterrorism
could have an uncertain, far reaching, and potentially devastating
impact.”42 The statement that the release of a biological pathogen
by a terrorist group should be considered as an occurrence of “low
probability but high impact” is correct, but only with important
qualiﬁcations. It does not mean any release of any agent formulation
under any circumstances. Rather, it presumes the release of a
very high quality product, efﬁciently distributed under optimum
conditions. Later sections of this monograph return to this question
in more detail.
There were repeated statements in 1999, most prominently
in the September 1999 GAO report, Combating Terrorism: Need for
Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessment of Chemical and Biological
Attacks, that no threat analysis of this subject—an examination of
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speciﬁc potential actors, their capabilities and intentions, and potential feasibilities—had ever been prepared inside the U.S. Government.43 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO) reports
for several years afterwards indicated that this situation had not
changed. The task in this monograph is—in brief—to provide an
evaluation of the overall problem, including several aspects rarely
considered as being themselves contributions to the threat. This will
be done by examining the following subjects:
• The evolution of state biological weapons programs.
• The evolution of nonstate actors (“terrorist”) biological
weapon capabilities.
• Framing “the threat” and setting the agenda of public
perceptions and policy prescriptions.
• Costs and consequences of the U.S. biodefense research and
development (R&D) program.
A threat assessment of the potential for the use of biological agents
by terrorist groups is a very different exercise than that customarily
faced in providing military threat assessments. No one ever did a
threat assessment of a Soviet T-34 tank, the Galosh antiballistic missile
(ABM) system that encircled Moscow, or an Akula-class nuclear
attack submarine (SSN) without those systems actually existing.
Declassiﬁcation of historical intelligence estimates of the capabilities
of forces and weapon systems that U.S. forces might have confronted
have certainly provided examples of inaccurate evaluations.44
Nevertheless, performance characteristics and capabilities were
often reasonably well known. Threat estimation of potential
bioterrorism is as different as possibly can be from the assessment
of a real operational system. It is almost purely hypothetical, and
rarely, if ever, is predicated on a speciﬁc identiﬁable group and its
capabilities. The range of possible assumptions is enormous, the
utilization of extreme worst-case assumptions is the rule, and these
universally depend on the projection of capabilities into the future,
rather than their existence at the present time.

9

PART II
THE EVOLUTION OF STATE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
PROGRAMS
Information derived solely from ofﬁcial U.S., Russian, and United
Kingdom (UK) sources has been available since 1988 which speciﬁes
how many and which nations maintain offensive biological weapon
programs. Ofﬁcial U.S. Government statements repeated for many
years that there had been four nations in possession of offensive
biological weapons programs in 1972 at the time of the signing of
the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC), and that this
number had increased to ten by 1989. (See Table 1.) In November
1997, the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA), in the course of a statement to BTWC negotiating states in
Geneva, increased the U.S. estimate to 12 nations. The additional two
states have never been identiﬁed by U.S. ofﬁcials. In July 2001, a U.S.
Government ofﬁcial stated that 13 countries had offensive biological
weapons (BW) programs.45
There has been no equivalent statement or revised estimate since.
All through the 1990s, it was common—in fact, nearly universal—
for commentators to depict the proliferation of state BW programs
as a constantly increasing trend. For example, Ambassador Donald
Mahley, the senior U.S. diplomat to all multilateral negotiations
in Geneva concerning chemical and biological weapons, stated in
an October 1996 Voice of America broadcast that “It is estimated
that over the last several years, the number of countries suspected
of having a biological weapons capability has risen.”46 However,
it seems very possible that it may have been a more or less stable
constant for the last 20 years. Moreover there were several notable
reductions or deletions from the list in the past decade. Since the
overall total was not very large to begin with, that would be a very
signiﬁcant reduction:
• The BW program of South Africa was terminated by 1995.47
• On November 1, 2002, U.S. Undersecretary of State John
Bolton stated that “Libya has an offensive BW program in
the research and development stage, and it may currently be
11

capable of producing small quantities of biological agents.”48
The statement was consistent with other U.S. statements
regarding Libya and BW during the preceding decade. The
phrasing in the 1993 report of the Russian Foreign Intelligence
Service was substantially stronger, stating that “There is
information that Libya is engaged in initial testing in the
area of biological weapons.”49 At the end of 2003, U.S. and
UK government teams working in Libya ascertained that
Libya had never had an offensive BW program. In the words
of a U.S. administration briefer, “Libya acknowledged past
intentions to acquire equipment and develop capabilities
related to Biological Weapons.” Libya additionally
“committed not to pursue a biological weapons program and
to accept the necessary inspections and monitoring to verify
that understanding.”50 Apparently Libya may at some point
have either procured or investigated the procurement of
dual-use equipment that might have served such a program,
information which had been picked up by intelligence. This
experience demonstrates a weakness in judgments based on
procurement monitoring. It can be a useful indicator, but it
cannot be considered deﬁnitive.51
• It is now clear that under the pressure of UNSCOM
inspections, the BW program of Iraq was disbanded between
1992 and 1995.52 Unfortunately, the Iraqi program provided
two other lessons. First, as shown by the period 1985 to 1990,
an offensive BW program can be hidden for quite a number
of years, including during the period in which it initiates
production. Second, as demonstrated in precisely the opposite
direction by the period 1998 to 2002, the most basic errors in
judgment can be made by Western intelligence agencies.53
In addition, further public political manipulation of those
mistaken judgments by political elites can take place.
• In 2004, the present U.S. administration also withdrew the
charge that Cuba maintained an offensive BW program.54
• Given the continued total denial by the Russian government
of international access to the BW facilities of the Ministry of
Defense of Russia (Kirov, Sergeiv Posad, and Yekaterinburg),
12

as well as continued impeded access to relevant facilities of
the Ministry of Health, it is impossible to be certain of the
status of BW-related activities in Russia. Nevertheless, they
certainly are very greatly reduced from what they were up to
1991-92.
U.S. Government
Arms Control
Compliance Reports
to Congress (1993,
1995)

Admirals Brooks,
Studeman, Trost1
(1988, 1990,
1991); Sec.
Cheney, 1990

Iraq

X

X

Libya

X

X

Syria

X

X

Iran

X

X

Egypt

X

U.S. and UK
Governments
(1995)

Russian
Federation2
Foreign
Intelligence
Report, 1993

Middle East
X
X

South/East Asia
China

X

X

North Korea
Taiwan

X
?

X

X

India

?

South Korea

?

Africa
South Africa
Russia

X
Ambiguity regarding continuation of offensive program dating from the USSR

1: “Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before
the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee on Intelligence Issues,” March 14, 1990, p. 54; “Statement of Rear Admiral William
O. Studeman, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical
Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues,” March
1, 1988, p. 48; “Statement of Admiral C. A. H. Trost, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, before the
Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1991 Budget of the United
States Navy,” February 28, 1990; “Remarks Prepared for Delivery by the Honorable Dick Cheney,
Secretary of Defense, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, June 11, 1990,”
News Release, No. 294-90, p. 4.
2: Proliferation Issues: A New Challenge After the Cold War, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Report (translation), JPRS-TND-9-3-007,
March 5, 1993.

Table 1. Nations Having BW Programs
at Least Approaching Weaponization.
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This would mean an absolute reduction by four states—South Africa,
Libya, Iraq, and Cuba—roughly one-third or one-fourth of the total
number of states that, according to the U.S. Government, maintain
offensive BW programs.
In addition, the status of several of the other national BW programs
appears to be less certain than previously implied. If one looks at a
recent public Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment of the
BW programs of Iran, North Korea, and Syria, it reads as follows:
Iran: Biological. Even though Iran is part of the BTWC, Tehran
probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued
to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise
that could be used in Tehran’s BW program. Iran probably has the
capability to produce at least small quantities of BW agents.
North Korea: Biological. North Korea has acceded to the
BTWC but nonetheless has pursued BW capabilities since the
1960s. Pyongyang acquired dual-use biotechnical equipment,
supplies, and reagents that could be used to support North
Korea’s BW program. North Korea is believed to possess a
munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed
it to weaponize BW agents and may have some such weapons
available for use.
Syria. Chemical and Biological. Syria probably also continued
to develop a BW capability.55

A sentence on North Korea by CIA Director Porter Goss on March
17, 2005, was somewhat stronger: “We believe North Korea has
active chemical weapons (CW) and BW programs and probably has
chemical and possibly biological weapons ready for use.”56
By political agreement among the States Parties to the BTWC,
Conﬁdence Building Measures (CBM) were to be submitted
annually, beginning in 1987. Iran did not submit any until 1998
and 1999, and when they did, they conveniently “forgot” to submit
perhaps the two most critical CBM forms out of eight. These were the
declarations that require the state to list national biological defense
research and development programs (Form A2) and past activities
in offensive/defense biological research and development programs
(Form F). In 2002, Iran declared that it “did not and does not have
any national, subnational or individual programs/activities and/or
facilities related to biological offensive purposes” and that it “did
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not and does not have any ‘National Biological Defensive Program’.
However the state has carried out some defensive studies on
identiﬁcation, decontamination, protection, and treatment against
some agents and toxins.”57 Ofﬁcial U.S. statements regarding the
Iranian BW program from 2001 onward reduced its apparent status
compared to assessments that had been offered in the late 1990s.
Reference to agent and weapon stocks disappeared. During President
George W. Bush’s ﬁrst term, the administration submitted only one
Arms Control Compliance report to Congress, although this report
is intended by Congress to be an annual submission. It did this in
its ﬁrst year in ofﬁce,58 and there has not been another one since. It
therefore remains to be seen how the Iranian BW program will be
described in any forthcoming version.
It is useful to recall a statement in 1999 by Dr. John A. Lauder,
then the Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for
Nonproliferation:
Intelligence is all about ascertaining not only the capabilities, but also the
intentions of one’s adversaries. Because of the dual utility of the technology
and expertise involved, the actual CBW threat is in fact directly tied to
intentions. Getting at this intent is the hardest thing for intelligence to
do, but it is essential if we are to determine with certainty the scope and
nature of the global biological and chemical weapons threat.59

U.S. Government ofﬁcials have never explained what the
word “capability” means in these statements: whether it means
the procurement of dual-use biotechnology equipment, a national
pharmaceutical production capacity, a dedicated defensive BW
R&D program, or the identiﬁcation of dedicated infrastructure for
offensive BW R&D. It is clear however that after the Iraq weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) intelligence failures demonstrated by the
reports of the Iraq Survey Group, the U.S. administration decided to
be much more cautious in the conclusions that it drew from perhaps
rather ambiguous information.60 Now and then over the previous
years, one had overheard a comment by a government ofﬁcial or
former government ofﬁcial to the effect that the evidence regarding
country X or Y was ambiguous or weak. But that body of relevant
evidence was never available for examination.61 In 2003, a WMDwide review of U.S. assessments was initiated, and the review on the
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proliferation of BW was headed by Lawrence Gershwin, National
Intelligence Council ofﬁcer for Science and Technology. This
apparently led to the readjustment of some previous assessments.62
In the case of Iran, an unusual opportunity was provided in
2003 by the presentation in Washington, DC, of detailed allegations
regarding Iran’s alleged BW program.63 The information was
provided by the same group that, in some cases, has been the ﬁrst to
provide information on Iran’s nuclear weapon complex, information
that had not been publicly known, nor apparently known by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and which led to
subsequent international action which forced Iranian government
disclosures. The BW information was quite detailed, naming
individuals, institutions, facilities, and locations. However, there has
never been any comment or corroboration of these allegations by
the U.S. Government or by any other government or international
agency. In November 2004, CIA Director Goss reported to Congress
that Iran continued “to vigorously pursue indigenous programs
to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.” However,
in March 2005, a special Presidential panel decried the state of
knowledge available to the U.S. Government regarding even Iran’s
nuclear weapon program.64 The U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence is currently reviewing the information available to
the administration regarding the nuclear, chemical, and biological
programs of Iran and North Korea. It will be interesting to see if that
report is made public, and, if so, what it will say in regard to the BW
programs of these two countries.
The CIA document containing the assessments of the Iranian,
North Korean, and Syrian BW programs quoted above is released
twice a year. Although the analogous paragraphs of the preceding
half-dozen or so years have not been included here for comparison,
the above statements are all lower key than they were in earlier years
in the same report. The caveats are notable: “probably,” “continued
to seek,” “the capability to,” “would have allowed it to,” “probably
also continued to develop.” No deﬁnitive statements of production,
stockpiling, or the nature of munitions are included.
As always, there is no discussion of Israel’s BW “capability” or
the status of its BW program in any public U.S. Government report.
It is interesting to note, in regard to the comments on proliferation
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that follow below, that in the only relevant data that appears to be
available, Israel had the second largest number of visitors to the U.S.
Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
following the UK, a country with which the United States shares BW
relevant information.65
We know that there was exaggeration of chemical weapon
proliferation in the past, so this is not a unique experience. In 1990,
Brad Roberts wrote “We entered the 1980s with three, four, or ﬁve
chemically armed states; we will enter the 1990s with upward of two
dozen chemically armed states” [my emphasis].66 The estimate of the
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had
been somewhat less, saying that “at least 15 states possessed chemical
weapons, with others attempting to acquire them.” However, on
January 24, 1989, his successor, General William Burns, told the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that only ﬁve or six of
these countries actually possessed stockpiles of chemical weapons
in addition to the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR).67
In August 2005, the U.S. Department of State released its most
recent version of its “Noncompliance” Report.68 Although nominally
an annual report, none had been released in 2004. Eight countries
are discussed in the section dealing with the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention. A sentence in the opening introductory
paragraph of the section states that “the speciﬁc cases addressed
here are those that have assumed obligations relevent to the BWC
and for which the most evidence exists of actual or potential
noncompliance.” The insertion of the word “potential” would
seem to substantially undercut the utility of the entire section. A
country should be considered in compliance with the BWC, or not
in compliance. Libya is still included as one of the eight nations,
although previous evidence presented by the current administration
and discussed earlier would provide no reason for that. Cuba also
is still present. The discussion of several countries was larded with
caveats, explicit or implicit. Most problematic was the inclusion of
general descriptors as suggestive evidence of noncompliance, such
as work in “advanced biotechnology techniques,” “aerosolization
techniques,” “legitimate public health and commercial uses [that]
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could also offer access to . . . BW enabling capabilities,” “the technical
capability to conduct limited offensive research,” the existence of
facilities that “could easily hide . . . capabilities for a potential BW
program.” All of these nonspeciﬁc indicators could equally apply to
every NATO ally of the United States, every EU country, to many
advanced developing nations, and above all, they would be more
applicable to the United States than to any other country. They are not
evidence of BWC treaty noncompliance. The use of such descriptors
will almost certainly place previous U.S. attributions of BWC
noncompliance in question in the minds of international diplomats
who have regularly read the analogous BW sections in earlier annual
U.S. Noncompliance reports. Finally, the 2005 report reinforces the
conclusion that the trend of BW proliferation has not been increasing
over the past decades, but that it has either been essentially constant
or has been decreasing.
The possibility of proliferation from three of the former or present
programs—South Africa, Iraq, and Russia—has been raised at times
by commentators. What is known is as follows.
South Africa. The South African BW program was minimal,
no more than a handful of researchers were involved. Contrary to
various press reports in the media, the program did not include
genetic engineering of pathogens, nor—as best is known—has there
been any proliferation from the program whatsoever.69
Iraq. There was no known emigration of researchers from the
former BW program of Iraq. However, the Addendum to the report of
the Iraq Survey Group released in March 2005 states that “Migration
of some WMD-associated program personnel to countries like Iran
or Syria is possible.” The phrasing is ambiguous in that it cannot be
deciphered if this is assumed to already have happened, or if it is a
generic statements suggesting that such migration could take place
in the future. No disaggregation of “WMD” is provided. The report
continues: “Since OIF [Operation IRAQI FREEDOM], the ISG [Iraq
Survey Group] is aware of only one scientist associated with Iraq’s
pre-1991 WMD program assisting terrorists or insurgents. However,
there are multiple reports of Iraqis with general chemical or biological
expertise helping insurgents produce chemical and biological
agents.”70 Nothing further is said about these “reports,” or whether
the ISG considered them credible or not. Much more signiﬁcantly,
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the Addendum then discusses a list of Iraqi BW scientists prepared in
early 2002 for the purpose of possible transmission to Syria. However,
it was not known if the list was or was not ever transmitted to Syria,
and the ISG did not discover any evidence of emigration of Iraqi BW
scientists to Syria.
The Twentieth Quarterly Report of the United Nations Monitoring,
Veriﬁcation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to the UN
Security Council does raise the possibility that some of the pathogen
cultures used for Iraq’s BW production program may still remain
unlocated in Iraq, a consideration that was also raised in the report
of the U.S. Iraq Survey Group.71
Russia. Again, contrary to undocumented hints that ﬁnd their
way into media reports, there is no known evidence of the transfer
of pathogens from the Soviet or continuing Russian programs to any
other state, either prior to 1992 or since 1992. Emigration of former
Soviet BW-related researchers to any proliferant state has been
minimal. The one known example is the move of 10-12 researchers,
largely from the institutes belonging to the Russian Academy of
Sciences rather than from former BW institutes, to Iran. There
continue to be statements, particularly by Dr. D. A. Henderson and
the Pittsburgh group, to the effect that the location of Soviet BW
“stockpiles”—not culture collections—produced in the USSR prior
to 1990 are not known. U.S. intelligence and defense agencies have
believed for over a decade that those “stockpiles” were destroyed
by the USSR roughly between 1988 and 1990, and there are no
indications that these agencies have ever altered that judgment.
Contrary statements appear to be deliberately misleading.
As late as June 2005 at a seminar at the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York City, Dr. Henderson said in reference to the
possible dispersion of smallpox from the USSR or Russia:
There have been economic problems in the Soviet Union, or now Russia.
Many of the scientists have left the laboratories. They’ve gone all over
the world, different places, some in the United States, Europe, some have
gone to North Korea, Iraq, Iran. So that [is what] the problem is, there is
just no way of knowing who has what and where, and that’s the concern,
that there may be others with the virus, but we just can’t ﬁnd out about
it.72
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No Soviet or Russian BW scientists are known by the U.S. intelligence
community to have gone to North Korea or to Iraq. Those few Russian
scientists that went to Iran did not come from institutes that worked
with smallpox. The U.S. intelligence community does not believe that
smallpox virus was transferred from the USSR or Russia to any other
state, not the three mentioned nor any other. The great majority of
Russian BW relevant scientists that emigrated did so to the United
States, the UK, Germany, France, Australia, Sweden, Finland, Israel,
etc., and not to states of BW proliferation concern.
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PART III
EVOLUTION OF NONSTATE ACTOR/TERRORIST
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITIES
Five extensive databases were published in the 1990s covering
nearly the entire 20th century, and several of these have been updated
so as to remain current. It is extremely important to distinguish
between the seven different categories of BW-related events that they
cumulatively cover: hoaxes, threats, consideration or discussion of
use, product tampering, purchase of materials, attacks on facilities,
attempts to produce biological agents or attempts to use them, and
actual use.73
These databases were compiled by:
• Harvey McGeorge, 1994, covering 1945-94;74
• Ron Purver, 1995, covering 1945-95;75
• Bruce Hoffman, 1998, covering 1990-98;76
• Seth Carus, 1999, covering 1990-99, and since updated;77 and,
• The Monterey Institute, 1999, covering 1990-99, and since
updated.78
The conclusions from these independent studies were uniform
and mutually reinforcing. There is an extremely low incidence of real
biological (or chemical) events, in contrast to the number of hoaxes,
the latter spawned by administration and media hype since 1996
concerning the prospective likelihood and dangers of such events.
A massive second wave of hoaxes followed the anthrax incidents in
the United States in October-November 2001, running into global
totals of tens of thousands. It is also extremely important that
analysts producing tables of “biological” events not count hoaxes. A
hoax is not a “biological” event, nor is the word “anthrax” written
on a slip of paper the same thing as anthrax, or a pathogen, or a
“demonstration of threat”—all of which various analysts and even
government advisory groups have counted hoaxes as being on one
occasion or another.79
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Those events that were real, and were actual examples of use,
were overwhelmingly chemical, and even in that category, involved
the use of easily available, off-the-shelf, nonsynthesized industrial
products. Many of these were instances of personal murder, and not
attempts at mass casualty use. The Sands/Monterey compilation
indicated that exactly one person was killed in the United States in
the 100 years between 1900 and 2000 as a result of an act of biological
or chemical terrorism.
Excluding the preparation of ricin, a plant toxin that is relatively
easier to prepare, there are only a few recorded instances in the
years 1900 to 2000 of the preparation or attempted preparation of
pathogens in a private laboratory by a nonstate actor.
The signiﬁcant events to date are:
• 1984, the Rajneesh, The Dalles, Oregon, use of salmonella on
food;
• 1990-94, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group’s unsuccessful
attempts to procure, produce and disperse anthrax and
botulinum toxin;80
• 1999, November 2001, al-Qaida,81 the unsuccessful early
efforts to obtain anthrax and to prepare a facility in which to
do microbiological work;
• October-November 2001, the successful “Amerithrax”
distribution of a high-quality dry-powder preparation of
anthrax spores, which had been prepared within the preceding
24 months.
Before discussing the Amerithrax and al-Qaida experiences in
some further detail, two books, one published and one still in press,
should be mentioned. These are particularly important because
they are collections of case studies which, between the two, contain
detailed reviews of virtually all the groups or individuals who
have—or who had been alleged to have—prepared or used chemical
or biological agents. The ﬁrst of the books is Toxic Terror
Terror, edited by
Jonathan Tucker,82 and the second is the forthcoming Motives, Means
and Mayhem: Terrorist Acquisition and Use of Unconventional Weapons,
edited by John Parachini.83 Between them the two books report on
28 case studies. They demonstrate that several right-wing groups in
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the United States produced ricin by extraction from mashed castor
bean pulp, and that the Rajneesh group did culture the salmonella
that it obtained. However, there is apparently no other “terrorist”
group that is known to have successfully cultured any pathogen. It
is precisely because of the exceptional nature of the Amerithrax case
that it becomes crucially signiﬁcant to identify the person or persons
who made the U.S. anthrax preparation, and to determine whether
that is the same individual or individuals who prepared and mailed
the postal envelopes. We will return to this in a moment.
In advance of the publication of his book, Parachini summarized
the conclusions from those studies that “provide an empirical
foundation to assess the motivations, behavior, and patterns related
to terrorist interest, or alleged interest, in unconventional weapons.”84
Perhaps the most important discovery from the ﬁrst of the two books
was that “Upon rigorous inspection, several of the empirical cases
frequently cited in the media and scholarly literature proved to be
apocryphal.” Parachini then discusses several factors that appear
to be most signiﬁcant in understanding the case studies. He ﬁnds
the mindset of the group leaders of the organization, exogenous
and internal constraints, and a combination of opportunity and
the technical capacity of the group to be “. . . the factors that most
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence a group’s propensity to seek to acquire and
to use unconventional weapons.” These conclusions are consistent
with those made by another highly experienced terrorism specialist,
Dr. Yoram Schweitzer of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel
Aviv University. In a recent conference presentation, he enumerated
four factors which he felt served as inhibitions to the consideration of
biological weapons within terrorist organizations: state dependency,
requirements of their own local constituency, requirements of the
international constituency, and group survival.85
To the degree that the leadership of a particular terrorist
organization does not have or escapes from these considerations,
they may consider the use of biological agents more seriously. This
may explain why the experience of the Rajneesh, Aum Shinrikyo,
and al-Qaida groups followed a path different from other terrorist
groups. Similar conceptions were explored as far back as 1989 in a
RAND study authored by Dr. Jeffrey Simon.86 This sort of analysis
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of real cases of the relevant behavior of real terrorist groups, carried
out by experienced analysts of terrorism, when it is not disregarded
entirely, is frequently met with disdain by the proselytizers of “the
bioterrorist threat,” as an example presented later in this monograph
indicates.
The extremely brief entry regarding terrorist groups and BW
and CW capabilities that appeared in the December 2004 report of
the U.S. National Intelligence Council was again minimalist in its
description:
Developments in CW and BW agents and the proliferation of related
expertise will pose a substantial threat, particularly from terrorists, as we
have noted.
• Given the goal of some terrorist groups to use weapons that can be
employed surreptitiously and generate dramatic impact, we expect
to see terrorist use of some readily available biological and chemical
weapons.87

Since this is a report that was looking ahead to the period between
2005 and 2020—the next 15 years—the reference to “readily available”
materials is particularly notable. It harks back to the conclusions
of the 20th century database studies, and certainly does not seem
to anticipate efforts at synthesis, genetic engineering, or anything
beyond the most elementary products. Dr. Stephen Morse predicted
much the same speaking to a day-long conference convened by the
U.S. National Academy of Sciences in January 2003. Morse previously
served in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and currently is director of
the Center for Public Health Preparedness at Columbia University’s
School of Public Health. In answering his own question “What
sources would terrorists use,” he stated that “Most are likely to use
easily obtained materials,” and that “state-sponsored [terrorists]
might use ‘classical BW’.”88
The latest U.S. Government intelligence estimates of the BW
capabilities of terrorist/nonstate actor groups became available in
February and March 2005. They ﬁrst appeared in three presentations
to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 16,
2005.
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Porter Goss, Director of Central Intelligence: “It may be only a
matter of time before al-Qaida or another group attempts to
use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons
(CBRN).”
Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:
“. . . we are concerned that they are seeking weapons of mass
destruction including chemical weapons, so-called ‘dirty bombs’
or some type of biological agent such as anthrax. . . . I am also
very concerned with the growing body of sensitive reporting
that continues to show al-Qaida’s clear intention to obtain and
ultimately use some form of chemical, biological, nuclear or
high-energy explosives (CBRNE) material in its attacks against
America.”
Jim Loy, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
“. . . the most severe threats revolve around al-Qaida and its
afﬁliates’ long-standing intention to develop, procure, or acquire
chemical, biological, radiological, and even nuclear, weapons for
mass-casualty attacks. Al-Qaida and afﬁliated elements currently
have the capability to produce small amounts of crude biological
toxins and toxic chemical materials, and may have acquired small
amounts of radioactive materials.”89

On March 17, 2005, it was the turn of Vice Admiral Jacoby, Director
of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, in a presentation to the U.S.
Senate Armed Services Committee:
We judge terrorist groups, particularly al-Qaida, [to] remain
interested in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)
weapons. Al-Qaida’s stated intention to conduct an attack exceeding
the destruction of 9/11 raises the possibility that planned attacks
may involve unconventional weapons. There is little doubt it has
contemplated using radiological or nuclear material. The question
is whether al-Qaida has the capability. Because they are easier to
employ, we believe terrorists are more likely to use biological agents
such as ricin or botulinum toxin or toxic industrial chemicals to cause
casualties and attack the psyche of the targeted populations.90

CIA Director Porter Goss made a presentation to the Committee as
well, and repeated the exact wording of his February 16 remarks
quoted above.
These rather similar extracts are the only references to nonstate
actor interest or capability in the CBW area in all the presentations.
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They are signiﬁcant for several reasons:
• No other group than al-Qaida was mentioned.
• All of the statements are less speciﬁc, more general, lower
key, than in the preceding (Tenet) years.
• In two of the three statements, B is grouped together with C,
R and N, and in one even with “E” (high-energy explosives),
making it impossible for someone without prior knowledge
to know whether there is a speciﬁc basis for including B.
• One of the statements refers to “small amounts of crude
biological toxins” which undoubtedly refers to ricin and not
to any pathogen.
• It has been known at least since November 2001, when U.S.
and UK military forces occupied Afghanistan, that al-Qaida
had been “seeking . . . anthrax” for 2 or 3 years prior to that
date. The information therefore concerns al-Qaida activities
before the fall of Afghanistan, and there is no publicly
available information to indicate that the group has been able
to continue their efforts since the end of 2001.
Anthrax is endemic in Afghanistan, and a limited domestic animal
vaccination program existed in the country. Nevertheless, there were
undoubtedly some number of animal cases of the disease per year,
but the group apparently never obtained a pathogenic strain.
In addition, all of the four recent speciﬁc references to al-Qaidaafﬁliated groups and ricin have turned out to be spurious. When the
Al Ansar camp in Northeast Iraq, “Kermal,” was overrun by U.S.
military forces, sampling showed no presence whatsoever of ricin,
nor of materials for its preparation. (In fact, the camp lacked running
water.) Before the invasion, there had been several statements by
U.S. Government and military ofﬁcials stating that the group was
preparing ricin in the camp. As late as the Vice Presidential debate on
October 5, 2004, U.S. Vice President Cheney, referring to Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, said, “He set up shop in Baghdad, where he oversaw the
poisons facility up at Kermal, where the terrorists were developing
ricin and other deadly substances to use.”91 Since this remark was
made long after the U.S. Government knew that the camp had
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contained no ricin, Cheney’s statement has to be considered either
ignorance or fabrication. There is no mention whatsoever of the Al
Ansar camp in the report of the Iraq Survey Group.
Individuals arrested by French police did not have any ricin nor
had they prepared any; they had only “planned to” produce ricin. The
“chemicals” that the group had was apparently sodium cyanide.
The “plots” in the spring of 2003 by a group associated with
Abu Musab Zarqawi in Jordan reportedly again involved sodium
cyanide, and not ricin. (Since Jordanian authorities have referred to
the planned use of 20 tons of high explosives in the planned event,
there is every reason to assume that the cyanide would have been
destroyed in any such massive high explosives blast.)
The London case is the last, and it is interesting to look at it in
some detail. The group, arrested in Wood Green, London, was in
possession of 22 castor bean seeds. Their equipment was a coffee
grinder, “. . . with a brown residue” (probably of coffee), a mortar
and pestle, and a hand-written recipe taken off the internet at an
internet café and transcribed into Arabic. The recipe was a derivative
of the Maxwell Hutchkinson recipe in the notorious The Poisoner’s
Handbook sold in thousands of copies at U.S. gun shows, a recipe that
would very likely not produce ricin or extremely little of it.
The ﬁrst tests for ricin in the London apartment were done by a
ﬁeld test kit and apparently registered positive. Within 2 days, 20
more speciﬁc tests were carried out at the British Defense Science
Technology Laboratory, Porton Down, resulting in 17 “negatives”
and three false positives. However the task of informing the London
Metropolitan Police fell to another Porton staffer with public liaison
responsibilities, who apparently either did not understand or
confused the information that he was to relay, with the result that he
phoned the press and police, saying that “traces of ricin” had been
found.92 His actions were later attributed to “incompetence.” Despite
this, as late as mid-February 2005, an ofﬁcial UN investigative group
reported to the UN Security Council that “al-Qaida-associated groups
in both the United Kingdom and Jordan came close to mounting
such [C, B, R, or N] attacks. It seems only a matter of time before
a successful chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attack
occurs.” (All four at once!)93 All of the above is incorrect. No ricin was
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found. Whether the UK Metropolitan Police ever announced a public
correction in 2003 is not known. It is unfortunate that misinformation
of this sort found its way into a UN document.
Scientists at Porton Down subsequently followed the Hutchkinson
recipe as an experiment. It produced sufﬁcient ricin to kill one person
if the total quantity would have been injected into a person. If eaten, it
was sufﬁcient to have caused vomiting and abdominal pain. If applied
to doorknobs to act as a contact poison, it would have had no effect
at all.94 Three other “recipes” were found with this ricin “recipe”: a
“rotten meat poison” to be prepared by mixing “corn ﬂour, meat,
dung, and dust together in a can,” a “recipe” for “cyanide poison”
to be obtained by boiling many thousands of ground apple seeds,
and a “potato poison” of equal inutility.95 However, Peter Clarke,
the head of Britain’s antiterrorist police branch, described the poison
plot as being “highly serious,” while Nigel Sweeney, the prosecutor,
said “These were no playtime recipes. These are recipes that experts
give credence to and experiments show work. They are scientiﬁcally
viable and potentially deadly.”96 Both statements are clearly wrong,
and there is no reason that law enforcement ofﬁcials anywhere in
the world should be able to do their work without inaccurate and
sensationalist comments.
As for the “Encyclopedia of Jihad,” in which such rudimentary
and often inadequate recipes are supposedly located, it is not clear
when it was composed. One suggestion is that its origin goes back to
the 1978-88 period of Afghan resistance to the USSR, which would
be as much as 10 years before al-Qaida came into existence. A second
suggestion is that it is an agglomeration that grew over the years,
with material successively added to it, materials on toxin production
being added in later years. Although the “Encyclopedia” is routinely
attributed to al-Qaida, it therefore may rather have been inherited,
or adopted, by the group.
Al-Qaida BW Efforts in Afghanistan: 1997-98 to 2001.
When we move to the al-Qaida group in Afghanistan, the
picture rapidly becomes much more serious, and all the preceding
semi-farcical events can be seen as inconsequential trivia. The ﬁrst
signiﬁcant and meaningful information on what al-Qaida may have
28

hoped at some point to achieve in the area of BW appeared in a
single page in the journal Science in mid-December 2003,97 and then
in declassiﬁed documentary materials that were obtained in the last
week of March 2004. Appended to the single page in Science by a
computer link was a list of 32 items: 11 books and 21 professional
journal papers nearly all dating from the 1950s and 1960s dealing
with pathogens or with BW. These were found in an al-Qaida training
camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan, in December 2001.98 Half of the
books dealt with historical or general aspects of BW and would be of
little operational utility to an effort to produce BW agents. However,
at least some of the journal papers and the remaining half of the
books could be useful for such an effort. A note in the Science paper
identiﬁed these as the documents referred to by CIA Director Tenet
in his February 2002 Senate testimony quoted below. They were
found only a few kilometers from the site near Kandahar airport
which contained the rudimentary equipment also procured by alQaida.
Most important of all, the documents indicated that “. . . al-Qaida’s
BW initiative included recruitment of individuals with Ph.D.-level
expertise who supported planning and acquisition efforts by their
familiarity with the scientiﬁc community.” The journal papers
concerned B. anthracis and Clostridium botulinum, but also Yersinia
pestis (plague) and Hepatitis A and C. Fragments of two of the
classiﬁed materials were included in the Science article as photocopies
of handwritten letters. The letterhead of one of them read “Society for
Applied Microbiology.” The second item reports that the individual
was not able to obtain a pathogenic culture of anthrax, and that “the
culture available in [deleted] is nonpathogenic.” The webpage of the
Society for Applied Microbiology advertises that organization as
“the UK’s oldest microbiological society.” Another snippet from the
handwritten letter, which explained that its author would “require
at least the air ticket expenses,” indicated that the person was ﬂying
either to or from the UK. The letter fragment also explained that “The
money with me is only to buy strains of vaccines.”
When the classiﬁed documents were obtained, it turned out that
nearly all of the pages consisted of the journal articles themselves, as
well as medical handbook excerpts on anthrax, plague, botulinum,
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etc.99 There were also many additional pages of references to both
books and journals, including many standard reference works
such as the SIPRI volumes on The Problems of Chemical and Biological
Warfare and the 1969 UN study on chemical and biological weapons.
It was the remaining 10 pages that were of importance. They were
two 3-page letters and accompanying handwritten notes suggesting
the layout of a laboratory and the equipment recommended to outﬁt
it, and “program requirements” including the time needed to train
whoever was going to work in the laboratory, and that person’s
assistants.
The correspondent already had a Ph.D. It is clear that the author
of the letter was not a native English speaker, and annotations on
some of the papers that he sent from England were in Arabic. Yet
the letters and the accompanying notes were written in English. It
suggested that either English was the only language that he and
the recipient shared in common, or it was the preferred language
for them to use with each other. In fact, the author was a Pakistani
microbiologist, whose native language would be Dari, and there
is reason to believe that he was writing to the Egyptian, Dr. alZawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s deputy. The writer reports visiting
a BL-3 facility—apparently in the UK—at which time he had been
shown a pathogen collection. He was not only trying to obtain and
export pathogen cultures, but he was also seeking to buy vaccines
for protecting personnel against anthrax infection. He was being
supplied by al-Qaida with funds with which to buy equipment and
materials, which he itemized. He had also been attending various
European conferences dealing with pathogens—or had obtained their
proceedings—including a conference on anthrax. The latest dates of
these were in July and September 1999. He had signed his letters,
named the laboratory that he had visited, and named its laboratory
director and identiﬁed one or two other individuals by name. All
these identiﬁcations were deleted in the declassiﬁed materials.
What the documents indicated was an individual with Ph.D.-level
training, who understood the professional microbiology literature,
and who understood professional procedures for purchasing
pathogen cultures. He was willing to trade on the access provided
by his status, while concealing the true purpose of his activities,
which was to provide al-Qaida with the means to attempt its ﬁrst
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real BW production capability. However, he was not prepared to do
any of the laboratory work himself. There is no evidence in any of the
declassiﬁed pages to indicate that any bacterial cultures had yet been
obtained, or that any had been shipped to Afghanistan or Pakistan,
or that any work had yet begun. In fact, all the phrasing on these
pages suggests that none of these things had yet occurred. There is
also no mention of the procurement of bacterial culture media that
would be necessary to have in hand before any work could begin.
These materials were characterized by various senior U.S. ofﬁcials
in 2002 and 2003. On February 25, 2002, General Tommy R. Franks,
the commander of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, reported that
following the examination of over 110 sites in Afghanistan:
. . . the United States has yet to ﬁnd evidence that al-Qaida was able to
create a chemical or biological weapon at any of its camps, command
centers, or caves in Afghanistan . . . We have seen evidence that al-Qaida
had a desire to weaponize chemical and biological capability, but we have
not yet found evidence that indicates that they were able to do so.100

Similarly in February 2002, U.S. CIA Director Tenet stated:
. . . we know that al-Qaida was working to acquire some of the most
dangerous chemical agents and toxins. Documents recovered from alQaida facilities in Afghanistan show that Bin Laden was pursuing a
sophisticated biological weapons research program.101

In his analogous “Threats” assessment in 2003, Tenet told the U.S.
Senate Committee on Armed Services, “I told you last year . . . that
bin Laden has a sophisticated biological weapons capability. . . . In
Afghanistan, al-Qaida succeeded in acquiring both the expertise and
equipment needed to grow biological agents, including a dedicated
laboratory in an isolated compound in Kandahar.”102
The inclusion of the words “pursuing” and “research program”
in 2002 arguably makes the statement factually correct. “Pursuing”
is not the same as saying that al-Qaida had produced any usable
product. However, Tenet’s 2003 language is substantially different
and implies much more, stating that al-Qaida “has a sophisticated
biological weapons capability” [emphasis added]. Nevertheless, the
declassiﬁed materials permitted some proper understanding for the
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ﬁrst time of the basis for statements by U.S. Government ofﬁcials
that the status of al-Qaida’s BW program might be more advanced
than had been anticipated.
The relevant passages in the annual CIA and Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) threat assessment presentations to the U.S. Senate
in February 2004 also very likely reﬂected judgments based on the
materials described above. From the Director of the DIA:
Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups remain interested in acquiring
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. We
remain concerned about rogue scientists and the potential that state
actors are providing, or will provide, technological assistance to terrorist
organizations. . . . While we have no intelligence suggesting states are
planning to give terrorist groups these weapons, we remain concerned
about, and alert to, the possibility.103

And from the Director of the CIA:
. . . I have consistently warned this committee of al-Qaida’s interest in
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Acquiring
these remains a “religious obligation” in Bin Ladin’s eyes, and al-Qaida
and more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN
materials. . . . Although gaps in our understanding remain, we see alQaida’s program to produce anthrax as one of the most immediate
terrorist CBRN threats we are likely face.104

The report of the U.S. September 11, 2001 (9/11) Commission
includes a bare few lines on the single individual identiﬁed to date,
a Malaysian, who was to have carried out al-Qaida’s laboratory
work:
In 2001, [Yazid] Sufaat would spend several months attempting to
cultivate anthrax for al-Qaida in a laboratory he helped set up near the
Kandahar airport. . . . Sufaat did not start on the al-Qaida biological
weapons program until after the JI’s [Jemaah Islamiah] December 2000
Church bombings in Indonesia, in which he was involved.105

Yazid Sufaat was arrested in Malaysia in December 2001. Publicly
available information about him has come from two important alQaida sources. The ﬁrst was Khaled Sheikh Mohammed who was
arrested on March 1, 2003, in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, at the home
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of a fugitive Pakistani bacteriologist, Dr. Abdul-Quddis Khan.
Handwritten notes and computer hard drives were seized in the
home, showing, according to a reporter’s description, that al-Qaida
had “. . . completed plans and obtained the materials required to
manufacture two biological toxins—botulinum and salmonella—
and the chemical poison cyanide.”106 Cyanide would not be
“manufactured,” and it is ambiguous if the “materials required”
were the pathogen cultures, the bacterial growth media, equipment
needed, or which of the above. “Plans” does not indicate that any
production took place. The press report of these discoveries was
contradictory in places, but claimed that the recruitment of named
scientists was discussed in the materials seized, production steps
were outlined, and equipment, such as that found in Afghanistan,
was described. Among items found was “a direction to purchase”
Bacillus anthracis. Nothing so far translated indicated access to the
most dangerous microbial strains or to any advanced processing or
delivery methods.
Mohammed also told his interrogators that Sufaat “. . . took the
lead in developing biological weapons for al-Qaida until he was
arrested by Malaysian authorities.”107 Sufaat reportedly obtained a
Bachelors degree “in biological sciences,” with a “clinical laboratory
concentration” from California State University in Sacramento in 1987.
He then served as a laboratory technician in the Malaysian military
and in 1993 established a company in Malaysia “to test the blood and
urine of foreign workers and state employees for drug use.”108 In the
course of recent years, his company, and possibly another owned
by his wife, appear to have been involved in ﬁnancial transfers and
the purchase of ammonium nitrate for producing explosives on
behalf of groups afﬁliated with al-Qaida operating in Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines. The suggestion that Sufaat was not
able to procure an appropriate strain of anthrax for use as a pathogen
demonstrates the same difﬁculty faced by the Aum Shinrikyo group
in Japan, which was only able to obtain the veterinary vaccine strain
of anthrax. This appears to have been corroborated by reports in
October 2003.109 A photograph taken at an internationally supported
animal vaccine production facility outside of Kabul by an Associated
Press photographer in November 2001 showed a large glass carboy
jar labeled “Anthrax spore Concentration.” It almost certainly
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contained Sterne strain anthrax vaccine. While incriminating as to
al-Qaida’s eventual intentions, all information to date indicates that
al-Qaida could not possibly have been responsible for the anthrax
attacks in the United States in 2001.
Additional reporting about Yazid Sufaat came from Hambali
(Raduan Isamuddin), the Indonesian operative of the al-Qaida
afﬁliated organization, Jemaah Islamiah, who was responsible for
the Bali bombing attack in August 2003. After his capture, Hambali
told his interrogators that he had earlier been collaborating with
Sufaat, that he had been “trying to open an al-Qaida bio-weapons
branch plant,” and that Sufaat had been “working on an al-Qaida
anthrax program in Kandahar,” in Afghanistan, but that after the U.S.
attack on the Taliban, they had planned to move the “program” to
Indonesia. However, Sufaat had been unable to obtain a pathogenic
strain of anthrax.110 In another report, U.S. and Malaysian security
ofﬁcials more accurately described the al-Qaida program to develop
biological and chemical weapons as having been “in the early
‘conceptual stage’ when it was cut short by the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan.”111 CBS nevertheless reported this as “al-Qaida may
be hard at work trying to produce weaponized anthrax and other
biological weapons.” Two weeks later, rumors that Jemmah Islamiah
branches in the Philippines were producing biological or chemical
agents were quickly proved to be spurious.112
An important question is how much and what kind of actual
laboratory work Sufaat might have been able to achieve in the
“several months” available to him at the Kandahar site. Sufaat and
Hambali apparently made four trips between Kandahar and Karachi
to purchase materials.113 The 1,000+ kilometer distance each way
means that these trips would have been by air, but nevertheless
could have together required several weeks to a month. Other lowerranking al-Qaida members also made purchasing trips to Pakistan.
As best is known, the Kandahar site appears not to have yet been
functioning, and may have contained little equipment aside from an
autoclave.
In addition to the declassiﬁed documentation found in Kandahar,
information obtained through the interrogations of K. S. Mohammed,
Hambali, and possibly some others at Guantanamo, Cuba, there was
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yet one more source of information that was obtained from within
al-Qaida regarding its interest in biological weapons. Additional
fragments of information found at the end of 2001 on computer discs
that appear to have belonged to Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri provide
little conﬁdence in the competence of the al-Qaida group to carry
out either chemical or biological agent production. If anything, they
detract from assumptions of capability, although they apparently
date from early in their efforts. The initial program investment was
either $2,000 or $2,000 to $4,000, and, after several months, Dr. alZawahiri considered it to have been “wasted effort and money.” The
group at that time seemed quite constrained in economic resources
as well as in applicable talent, and did not at all appear to have the
kinds of ﬁnancial resources available to the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo
group. This early effort appears to have been intended to produce
a “nerve gas” from a commercial agricultural insecticide. Perhaps
the most important information in an al Zawahiri memorandum of
April 15, 1999, is contained in the following sentences:
. . . we only became aware of them [biological weapons] when the enemy
drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they
can be produced simply with easily available materials. . . .
I would like to emphasize what we previously discussed—that looking
for a specialist is the fastest, safest, and cheapest way [to embark on a
biological and chemical weapons program].114

Other information indicates that Al-Zawahiri’s remark about “the
enemy drew our attention to them” refers to U.S. Secretary of Defense
William Cohen’s November 1997 national television appearance,
which included greatly exaggerated prediction of what his 5-pound
bag of sugar standing in for anthrax could achieve if dispersed over
Washington, DC.115
Early in March 2005, a press item returned to the material found
on a computer disc when K.S. Mohammed was captured, and the
sentence quoted earlier from the 2003 Washington Post story: “. . .
[al-Qaida] obtained the materials required to manufacture two
biological toxins—botulinum and salmonella—and the chemical
poison cyanide. They are also close to a feasible production plan
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for anthrax.”116 This information was attributed to “U.S. intelligence
services quoted in the U.S. media.” This can only refer to the general
and ambiguous statement by senior U.S. intelligence ofﬁcials quoted
previously. As indicated, the cyanide information dates back to 1998.
“Managed to obtain material necessary to make” does not indicate
that anything was made, or even that all materials necessary—such
as the pathogen—had been obtained. The very next day, an editorial
in the Washington Post stated, “This country has already experienced
one anthrax attack. Security ofﬁcials have repeatedly stated their
belief that al-Qaida and others continue to search for more lethal
bioweapons.”117 The “others” referred to by Tenet in February 2004
claimed their interest in “CBRN” not speciﬁcally “bioweapons.”
And there are no identiﬁable public statements by U.S. “security
ofﬁcials” saying that “al-Qaida and others” were searching “for more
lethal bioweapons” than anthrax. It is possible that the “security
ofﬁcials” that Washington Post editors had in mind came from
another press comment during a March 1, 2005, Interpol conference:
“Security ofﬁcials have long worried of the risk of an al-Qaida attack
using biological weapons such as anthrax, ricin, botulinum toxin,
smallpox, plague, or Ebola.”118 There are no identiﬁable statements
by any “security ofﬁcial” warning of the potential use by al-Qaida of
smallpox or Ebola, and the suggestion is highly implausible.
On March 31, 2005, the Report of the Commission on the Intelligence
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
became available. The information that it contained concerning
the status of al-Qaida and BW was vastly different from the brief
paragraph in the report of the 9/11 Commission.
The Intelligence Community concluded that at the time of the
commencement of the war in Afghanistan, al-Qaida’s biological weapons
program was both more advanced and more sophisticated than analysts
had previously assessed.
. . . al-Qaida’s biological program was further along, particularly with
regard to Agent X, than prewar intelligence indicated. The program was
extensive, well-organized, and operated for 2 years before September
11, but intelligence insights into the program were limited. The program
involved several sites in Afghanistan. Two of these sites contained
commercial equipment and were operated by individuals with special
training. Documents found indicated that while al-Qaida’s primary
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interest was Agent X, the group had considered acquiring a variety of
other biological agents. The documents obtained at the training camp
included scientiﬁc articles and handwritten notes pertaining to Agent X.
Reporting supports the hypothesis that al-Qaida had acquired several
biological agents possibly as early as 1999, and had the necessary
equipment to enable limited, basic production of Agent X. Other
reporting indicates that al-Qaida had succeeded in isolating cultures of
Agent X. Nevertheless, outstanding questions remain about the extent of
biological research and development in pre-war Afghanistan, including
about the reliability of the reporting described above.119

The sources for the Commission’s remarks all refer to classiﬁed
reports. The two Presidential Commissions appear to have used
different procedures to obtain documents for examination, and one
suggestion is that, as a result, they did not, in all cases, obtain the
same documentation for review.120 Of course, if the hard information
prior to the coalition invasion of Afghanistan regarding al-Qaida and
BW was nil, then their efforts will certainly appear “more advanced
and more sophisticated” than was previously understood once the
actual information in the now declassiﬁed documents was found. Is
it possible to make any further guesses regarding the substance of
the Commission’s phrasing?
The information in the “documents obtained at the training
camp” and “the handwritten notes” have just been explained in
detail in the preceding pages, and concern anthrax, botulinum toxin,
plague, and Hepatitis A and C. Hepatitis viruses are extremely
difﬁcult to work with, even for professional virologists. They require
cell culture technology, but could in theory be used to contaminate
food and water. The most recent U.S. intelligence statements quoted
earlier refer more often to botulinum toxin than they do to anthrax.
Nevertheless, “Agent X” almost certainly refers to anthrax, with
botulinum toxin the most plausible second guess. The key question
regarding the information quoted above is whether there is additional
documentary or material evidence to support it beyond that already
obtained in the papers found in November 2001 and the locations
occupied at that time.121 Those did not indicate success “in isolating
cultures of Agent X.” And only the Sterne vaccine strain had been
available to the group in Afghanistan. The statement that much of
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the Commission’s brief summation was a “hypothesis” dependent
on “reporting,” at the same time as there remain “outstanding
questions . . . including about the reliability of the reporting described
above,” seems to leave much of it an open question and possibly
adds nothing of substance to what was already known from the
declassiﬁed documents.122 Nevertheless, the reference to two sites
containing “commercial equipment” may suggest additional alQaida efforts beyond those disclosed in the declassiﬁed documents
and related information so far available to the author.
A member of the Presidential Intelligence Commission was
asked if he thought that one should be any less skeptical regarding
the intelligence concerning al-Qaida BW activities in Afghanistan
than the allegations that had been made by the U.S. administration
regarding the status of Iraq’s BW program in the years between
1995 and 2002. He replied that one should not be any less skeptical
regarding the intelligence about al-Qaida’s BW capabilities.123

Table 2. Comparison of BW Efforts
by the Aum Shinrikyo and al-Qaida.
Pakistani press reports indicate that the Pakistani microbiologist
who had assisted al-Qaida in information gathering, as well as an
alleged “Yemeni . . . studying microbiology at the University of
Karachi” were arrested in October 2001. If this is the case, with the
facility overrun by U.S. forces in December 2001, Sufaat also arrested
in December 2001, and the two above individuals arrested in October
2001, even before US/UK forces had found the documentation in
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Kandahar, it would appear that the al-Qaida BW program may have
been dismantled at the end of 2001. The location of Dr. Khan, in whose
home K. S. Mohammed was captured, is known to the Pakistani
government. He is incapacitated and is therefore reportedly not a
factor of concern. Whether other dispersed individuals of the group
have any available work sites for microbiology in any other location
is unknown. The statement by French Interior Minister Dominique
de Villepin at Interpol’s First World Conference on Bioterrorism in
Lyon, France, on March 2, 2005, claiming that “. . . after al-Qaida
groups were smashed in Afghanistan, international terrorist groups
were still working on chemical and germ weapons in Georgia’s
Pankisi Gorge” seems highly implausible insofar as it refers to “germ
weapons.”124 Al-Qaida elements in the Pankisi Gorge had reportedly
been killed, captured, or dispersed by a joint U.S.-Georgian special
operation in 2002. In contrast to the French statement, Major
General Eric Olson, the second ranking U.S. military ofﬁcer in
Afghanistan, told the Associated Press on February 25, 2005, that he
had no indications that al-Qaida was attempting to obtain nuclear or
biological weapons, that there was “no evidence that they’re trying
to acquire a terrorist weapon of that type.”125
The three terrorist groups that have been innovative in their
methods have one aspect in common: the Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka,
the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo, and the al-Qaida organization have
all actively recruited among educated, college graduates, and
speciﬁcally sought individuals with particular knowledge and
training. (The Tamil Elam showed no interest in BW, and in only
one anomalous incident used industrial canisters of chlorine gas.)
K. S. Mohammed completed a degree at a U.S. college, as did Yazid
Sufaat. An unclassiﬁed summary of information on detainees at
Guantanamo states that “More than 10 percent of the detainees
possess college degrees or obtained other higher education, often at
Western colleges, many in the United States. Among these educated
detainees are medical doctors, airplane pilots, aviation specialists,
engineers, divers, translators, and lawyers.”126 At least one holds a
degree in electrical engineering, another holds a graduate degree in
aviation management, and a third holds a masters degree in petroleum
engineering. Such recruiting patterns do not automatically translate
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into either interest or capability in BW, but they would be a key
advantage should the interests of such a group turn in that direction,
as Dr. al Zawahiri’s memorandum quoted earlier indicates.
The reports of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and
that of the U.S. CIA’s Iraq Survey Group (ISG) provide valuable
insights into what one might expect of the initial efforts by a terrorist
group. The report of the ISG describes the initial failures of the
Iraqi national CW program to produce a chemical weapon between
1971 and 1978.127 The information provided does not clarify if the
impediments were in the industrial synthesis of chemical agents or
in their weaponization. Nevertheless, this involved a state program,
state resources, and a period of 8 years. It was previously known
from UNSCOM reports that the same failure occurred in the Iraqi
BW program in the “early 1970’s,” and again between 1974 and
1978. The ISG report also provides information on two efforts made
by insurgent groups inside Iraq in 2002-03 to produce very basic
chemical weapon agents. Although the services of several chemists
were obtained to produce the agents, both these efforts failed.128 It is
uniformly assumed that the production of classical chemical weapon
agents as well as their dissemination is simpler than that of classical
biological weapon agents.
All of the preceding explains the crucial signiﬁcance of establishing
precisely who was the perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax incidents in
the United States, and how and where the anthrax preparation was
produced. It is the sole outlier event. Without it, and except for the
Rajneesh salmonella incident, there would still be no evidence of
capability on the part of a nonstate actor to produce a biological agent.
There has also been no evidence to date of the provision of assistance
by a state to a nonstate actor to produce biological agents.129 If it should
turn out, as is currently assumed, that the Amerithrax perpetrator
came from within the U.S. Government’s own biodefense program,
with access to strains, laboratories, people, and knowledge, then all
the conceptions about the signiﬁcance of the events get substantially
altered. It does not alter the fact that it can be done, and that the
preparation could have been dispersed in a much more harmful
way. But it does affect the crucial question of “By Whom”?—and
the projections imputed to traditional “terrorist” groups.130 With this
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exception, all attempts by other groups have either failed or been
limited to relatively low levels of competence. Reports in 2002 and
again in mid-2004 indicated that the investigations into the source of
the anthrax used in the U.S. events were yielding results.131 These had
apparently reached the stage that suggested which U.S. laboratory
had been the source of the strain used. Nevertheless, there has been
no identiﬁcation of the perpetrator or resolution of the case. In the
words of former Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Chemical and Biological Defense, Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, “We
do not know who was responsible. We do not know the source of
the anthrax spores (i.e., were they produced, stolen, or purchased?).
We do not know the motive for the attacks. And, therefore, we are
unable to make intelligent assessments about the likelihood of similar
attacks in the future.”132
In the midst of all these developments, and the information
derived from investigations in Afghanistan, October 2003 saw
the amazing report that the U.S. DoD had been selling surplus
equipment of the kind that could be used precisely for producing
BW pathogens, and that some of the equipment purchased by
middlemen in the United States had been resold to buyers in, among
other countries, the Philippines, Malaysia, Egypt, Canada, Dubai,
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), “for transit to other countries
prohibited from receiving exports of trade security controlled items.”
U.S. ofﬁcials in the past had identiﬁed individuals in Canada, the
Philippines, Dubai, and in the UAE who are known to be involved
in transshipments to terrorist-supporting countries. The sales had
been made by the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service,
which in 3 1/2 years had sold 18 safety cabinets, 199 incubators, 521
centrifuges, 65 evaporators, and 286,000 full-body protective suits.133
One can compare this to the reports of the few pieces of elementary
equipment found in the al-Qaida site in Afghanistan, and the
signiﬁcance that was given to those ﬁnds.
The items sold are all available on the commercial market in
the United States as well as elsewhere, but DoD’s selling price was
additionally “pennies on the dollar” of the cost of the original items.
More accurately, it averaged 10 cents on the dollar of original costs,
even if the equipment was unused. In the words of a Congressional
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subcommittee chairman, “DoD should not be a discount outlet for
bioterrorism equipment.” Export of these items would routinely
require an export license if they had been sold for export, and the
new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had already begun
monitoring the import and export of the same kinds of materials.
Even recent internal DoD regulations had been violated. The U.S.
GAO, the investigative and oversight body that serves the U.S.
Congress, was responsible for the report, which documented this
absent-minded but gross evasion by a branch of the U.S. DoD of
common sense and of existing export controls on materials that could
be used for the production of biological agents.
After the years of strident alarms regarding the interest of
international terrorist groups in biological weapons, and after the
U.S. domestic anthrax incidents in 2001 and the enormous post-9/11
buildup of “Homeland Security” to protect against bioterrorism
involving expenditures of $7-8 billion by the time of the GAO
report in the fall of 2003, this was an amazing demonstration of one
dysfunctional branch of government facilitating exactly what the rest
of the government was ostensibly trying to protect against. To add
to the irony, the 3 1/2-year period investigated—between October 1,
1999, and March 31, 2003—places its onset during the tenure of none
other than Secretary of Defense William Cohen, avid warner of “the
bioterrorism threat.”
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PART IV
FRAMING “THE THREAT” AND SETTING THE AGENDA
OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND POLICY PRESCRIPTION
Well before October-November 2001, the spectre of “bioterrorism”
beneﬁted from an extremely successful sales campaign. Between
1995 and 2001, the most common portrayal of the potential for
“bioterrorism” was the facile catchphrase, “It’s not a matter of
whether; just when.”134 This proved to be one of the most successful
catchphrases since the old soap-powder advertisement, “Duz Does
Everything.” But, of course, it was a matter of both “whether” and
“when,” or at least it might have been in this initial period. Those
calling for preparation and preventive measures certainly believed,
at a minimum, that the imagined sequel to whether and when,
“. . . and with what consequences,” could be affected. That was the
purpose of the wake-up calls. But “whether” and “when” were
modiﬁable also, depending on the policies chosen. It depended
most particularly on how the threat was portrayed, and how that
portrayal was broadcast to potentially interested parties around the
world. Perhaps bioterrorism is a given between whenever “now”
is and decades hence, but lots of things can intervene between now
and then. The inﬂated predictions that were common were certainly
not realistic. Much worse, in addition to being wrong, inﬂated
predictions were counterproductive. They induced interest in BW in
the wrong audiences.
One immediate problem was the conﬂation of biological
weapons and “bioterrorism” (and even between biological “agents”
and “weapons”). Biological weapon use had been possible in the
entire 20th century. Now the entire subject became subsumed
under “bioterrorism.” That simple switch in language made it
easy to transfer levels of state capability to “terrorists.” Everything
became and was referred to as “bioterrorism.” This wiped out any
discrimination, or attempt to discriminate, between the relevant
capabilities of state programs and existing terrorist groups as they are
known to date. The possibility of incidents involving low numbers of
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casualties evolved in 2 or 3 years to “mass casualty” terrorism, and
in several more years to “Apocalyptic Terrorism.” Generic terrorist
groups (excluding the perpetrator of the U.S. anthrax events)—none
of which had yet shown the ability to master their microbiological A,
B, C’s in the real world—were endowed with the prospective ability
to genetically engineer pathogens. Yet the resources and capabilities
available to states and to terrorist groups are vastly different.
If we go back 10 years or so, we can look at a series of portrayals
of the threat. A 1997 U.S. DoD Defense Science Board report grouped
the characteristics of both chemical and biological warfare agents:
• They are relatively easy to obtain (certainly compared to
nuclear), and potential users do not need access to large and
expensive facilities to achieve potent capabilities.
• They can be developed and produced in laboratory or small
scale industrial facilities, which makes them difﬁcult to detect.
Also, the technologies required to produce them often have
commercial applications as well, so their “dual use” can be
plausibly denied.
• They can be extremely lethal, so small quantities can be very
effective.
• They can be delivered by a variety of means.135
The paragraph went on to add that “A few kilograms of a biological
agent could threaten an entire city.” Summations of this kind were
grossly oversimpliﬁed even further. Former Secretary of the Navy
Richard Danzig’s 1997 and 1999 papers contain an example: “. . .
a kilogram [of anthrax], depending on meteorological conditions and
means of delivery, has the potential to kill hundreds of thousands of
people in a metropolitan area . . . biological weapons are so potent
and so cheap . . . the technology is readily available . . . so many of our
adversaries have biological warfare capabilities . . .”136 They do have
“the potential,” but they might also kill only few, or none at all. More
correctly, not 1 kilogram but some 50 kilograms could kill anywhere
between 0 and 95,000 people, depending on the initial population
number, the quality and nature of the anthrax preparation, the
meteorological conditions, and the means of delivery if distributed
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over a city. More recent model studies by Dean Wilkening at Stanford
University have demonstrated the difﬁculties in releasing biological
agents so that they are infective in large airborne releases. The model
studies show very wide ranges of variability, over ﬁve log units
(orders of magnitude).137
The years between 1995 and 2000 were characterized, then, by:
• spurious statistics (hoaxes counted as “biological” events);
• unknowable predictions;
• greatly exaggerated consequence estimates;
• gross exaggeration of the feasibility of successfully
producing biological agents by nonstate actors, except in the
case of recruitment of highly experienced professionals, for
which there still was no evidence as of 2000;
• the apparent continued absence of a thorough threat
assessment; and,
• thoughtless, ill-considered, counterproductive, and
extravagant rhetoric.
Nonetheless, these descriptions were considered realistic and
taken seriously by people responsible for public safety in various
sectors: the Director of the World Trade Center in 2001 reported that
“What the security people and others were telling us was that the
threat was chem-bio. . . . We felt this was the coming wave.” He
acted on that information, purchasing protective suiting and training
programs for his own security personnel. The very day after 9/11,
former Secretary of Defense Cohen predicted that the next attack by
al-Qaida would involve biological weapons. There were authoritative
assessments during the same period that were substantially different,
offering more sophisticated accounts of impediments to successful
“bioterrorism.” Some of these were made by Colonel David Franz,
then Deputy Commander of USAMRIID; John Lauder, then Special
Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence; and Dr. Steven
Block, Chair of a U.S. DoD Defense Science Board “Summer Study
on Biological Weapons”—as well as Dr. Brian Jenkin’s critique of
“fact-free analysis.” All these went by the board after 9/11 and the
anthrax events that followed in October and November 2001.138
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Five essential requirements must be mastered in order to produce
biological agents:
• One must obtain the appropriate strain of the disease
pathogen.
• One must know how to handle the organism correctly.
• One must know how to grow it in a way that will produce the
appropriate characteristics.
• One must know how to store the culture, and to scale-up
production properly.
• One must know how to disperse the product properly.139
A U.S. military ﬁeld manual dating back to the 1960s remarks
on the attributes of a desirable BW agent, that in addition to its
pathogenicity, “means must be available for maintaining the
agent’s virulence or infectivity during production, storage, and
transportation.”140 One should add, most particularly during its
dispersal as well. Two members of Sweden’s biodefense program
stress methods on how to optimize formulations of BW agents as
the most critical step of all: “They key competence is . . . how to
formulate the organisms to facilitate aerosolization of particles that
cause severe disease by inhalation.”141
It is interesting that the classiﬁed 1999 DIA report quoted earlier in
the section on state programs contained a single sentence regarding
the possible use of BW agents by terrorist groups: “Terrorist use
should also be anticipated primarily in improvised devices, probably
in association with an explosive.”142 No anticipation of the capability
for aerosol distribution was mentioned, no overﬂight of cities, sports
stadiums, etc.
In a recent BW “Risk Assessment” published elsewhere, a group of
authors from the Sandia National Laboratory listed a series of factors
closely paralleling the above as “Technical Hurdles to Successful
BW Deployment”: acquisition of a virulent agent; production of the
agent in suitable form and quantity; and, effective deployment of the
agent.
This was summed up in simple words as “obtaining a pathogen or
toxin . . ., isolation, ampliﬁcation, protection against environmental
degradation, and development of an effective dissemination method.”
They concluded that “Even a low-consequence event requires a
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considerable level of expertise to execute.”143 Dr. Steven Block, Chair
of the U.S. DoD Defense Science Board Summer Study on biological
weapons in the late 1990s explained the same requirements.
A lesson from the Aum Shinrikyo case is that any group bent on developing
offensive bio-weapons capabilities must overcome two signiﬁcant
problems, one biological and the other physical. First, it must acquire
and produce stable quantities of a suitably potent agent. For a variety
of reasons, this is not the trivial task that it is sometimes made out to be.
Second, it must have an effective means of delivering the agent to the
intended target. For most, but not all, bio-weapon agents, this translates
into solving problems of dispersal. Programs in both the United States
and the USSR devoted years of effort to perfecting these aspects.144

Unfortunately, a recent example provides the sort of grossly
uninformed description that is more frequently provided to the
general public. Speaking at the Harvard Medical School on June 1,
2005, and trading on his training as a medical doctor as he frequently
does, Senator Frist claimed that “. . . a few technicians of middling skill
using a few thousand dollars worth of readily available equipment
in a small and apparently innocuous setting [could] mount a ﬁrstorder biological attack. It is even possible to synthesize virulent
pathogens from scratch, or to engineer and manufacture prions . . .”
He repeated that this was “the single greatest threat to our safety and
security today.”145 The remarks are a travesty: “. . . a few technicians .
. . middling skill . . . few thousand dollars,” leading to a ““ﬁrst-order”
a biological attack, and additionally extending this to “synthesizing
virulent pathogens” in the same breath.
To bolster his argument, Senator Frist larded his presentation
with other gross inaccuracies, claiming that “During the Cold War,
the Soviet Union . . . stockpiled 5,000 tons annually of biowarfareengineered anthrax resistant to 16 antibiotics.” The only source in
the world for the tonnage of anthrax stockpiled by the USSR is Dr.
Ken Alibek.146 He has never quoted a ﬁgure higher than 200 tons, and
he has never claimed that the 200 tons was produced “annually,”
or in any single year. The USSR’s anthrax stockpile consisted of a
genetically unmodiﬁed classical strain (or strains).147 The antibiotic
resistant strain which was developed by Soviet BW laboratories in
the mid- to late-1980s was not resistant to 16 antibiotics, but to half
that number, and had not yet reached the point of being stockpiled
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by the time that the Soviet BW program began to be cut back in 1989.
Finally, the 5,000-ton ﬁgure is the approximate sum of the annual
production capacities of all Soviet-era BW mobilization production
facilities that would have initiated production only with the onset
of, or just prior to a (nuclear) war with the United States. No such
quantities of BW agents were ever produced in the USSR.
Scenarios and Exercises.
If one looks at the scenarios used in various exercises carried
out by U.S. Government agencies or private institutes, one ﬁnds the
following:148
• [Unnamed], March 1998, Mexico-Texas border: smallpox
chimeric viral agent (following Alibek).
• Top Off I, May 2000: aerosolized plague, FEMA and U.S.
Department of Justice.
•

[Unnamed], July 2000: aerosolized pneumonic plague, U.S.
Department of Justice and DoD DTRA.

• Dark Winter, June 2001: aerosolized smallpox, Johns Hopkins
Center for Biosecurity and three collaborating groups.
• Sooner Spring, April 2002: smallpox, National Memorial
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), Oklahoma.
• Top Off II, May 2003: aerosolized plague, U.S. DHS and U.S.
Department of State.
• Atlantic Storm, January 2005: Aerosolized dry powder
smallpox, Center for Biosecurity (now afﬁliated with the
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center).
• Top Off III, April 2005: aerosolized pneumonic plague, U.S.
DHS.
The Dark Winter exercise used a person-to-person secondary
transmission rate (RO) of 10, three times the historical average of
three.149 Pneumonic plague has a historical average transmission rate
of one.150 Nevertheless, there are indications that the Top Off 2 and
3 exercises used values ﬁve times as high, and the July 2000 exercise
used a value of 10. Such inﬂated transmission rates, of course,
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make it next to impossible for the game players to do very much to
contain the outbreak, and assure a disastrous outcome irrespective
of whatever control measures the players may attempt to carry out.
Plague is known to microbiologists who routinely work with
it as a “difﬁcult,” “skittish” agent, “fragile and fastidious” in the
laboratory. That a terrorist group would be likely to manage that
seems very unlikely. In addition, plague organisms die very quickly
when aerosolized, and both the United States and the UK failed for
years in attempts to aerosolize plague. Both the British and U.S. BW
programs in the 1950s ﬁeld tested plague in open air ﬁeld trials using
animals, and the tests failed. The USSR BW program, with many
more man-years of work, apparently did succeed in producing
an aerosolizable plague agent. Did the Top Off scenario builders
know of the efforts of the British and American BW programs to
aerosolize plague and the outcome of those efforts? Did they know
of the negative results, or decided to simply disregard them in any
case? In the ﬁrst case they could be accused of ignorance, in the
second case of incompetence. They ﬁnessed the problem, however,
by saying that the terrorists “obtained a sample” of the plague. But
what kind of sample? Was it aerosolizable? From whom did they get
it? In what quantity? Did they have to culture it? If so, how did they
manage that? How was it dispersed? The scenario is not meant to
answer these questions, which, of course, would all be crucial in the
real world to determining whether a terrorist group was capable of
producing and dispersing plague. Its purpose is simply to present a
situation for the responders to deal with, without bothering with the
question of how the situation came about, its likelihood, or in fact if
it could take place at all.
In an inﬂuential August 2003 monograph, Richard Danzig
suggested four cases that he recommended for “near term planning
premises.”
1. A large-scale outdoor aerosol anthrax attack.
2. A large-scale outdoor aerosol smallpox attack.
3. An attack that disseminates botulinum toxin in cold drinks.
4. An attack that spreads foot and mouth disease among cattle,
sheep, and pigs.151
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Danzig adds that “. . . these cases . . . are real, possibly imminent, and
very substantial dangers. Virtually all experts and policymakers agree
with this.” Despite that, he added “. . . in the immediate future, most
attacks are likely to be versions, often lesser version, of these cases.”
Nevertheless, at the same time Danzig routinely speaks of “reloads,”
and of terrorists producing sufﬁcient quantities “that can be used
again and again” in a series of attacks crossing the United States.152
That is scarcely “a lesser version.” Casualties resulting from Case
#3 would be identiﬁed almost immediately and would be quickly
limited. Case #4 would have serious economic consequences, but
not human public health ones. Cases #1 and #2 are the signiﬁcant
ones, and comparable to the exercise scenarios listed above.
The same holds for the BW cases among the ofﬁcial “Planning
Scenarios” of the U.S. DHS. Of 15 selected scenarios, four concerned
BW:
#2. Biological Attack, aerosolized anthrax, in ﬁve cities in
succession;
#4. Biological Attack, aerosolized plague in three locations in a
single city;
#13. Biological Attack, liquid anthrax placed in ground beef in a
factory, resulting in intestinal anthrax, mortality in the low hundreds;
and,
#14. Biological Attack, Foot and Mouth Disease; economic loss,
no human mortality.153
Again, it is the ﬁrst two of these four scenarios that are of prime concern
since they are the ones capable of producing mass casualties.154
However, the capabilities that would have to be posited for the
above scenarios are far beyond the present and “near term” capabilities
of any known terrorist group. (As before, the perpetrator(s) of the
U.S. anthrax events is/are excluded.) That is particularly the case for
smallpox. The counter argument, even by those who accept that fact,
is obvious, and was presented by Dr. Gerald Epstein in Congressional
testimony in February 2005.
Exactly how close terrorist groups are right now to the capability to
conduct a major biological attack matters if we want to know how likely
it is that such an attack will take place in the near future. However,
looking out over the several years that our defensive preparations will
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take to implement, the details of today’s threat are less important than
the realization that the rapidly increasing capability, market penetration,
and geographic dissemination of relevant biotechnical disciplines will
inevitably bring weapons capabilities within the reach of those who may
wish to use them for harm.155

“Inevitably” is longer than “several” years.
Examining the Assumptions of One Exercise in Detail: Atlantic
Storm.
An excellent example of grossly misleading assumptions
underlying the more advanced scenarios and base cases was provided
by the seventh exercise listed above, “Atlantic Storm,” which took
place on January 14, 2005.156 The comments below concern only the
assumptions used by the producers of the exercise to argue that the
terrorist group they envision would have obtained, produced, and
distributed a dry-powder preparation of smallpox. These comments
do not concern at all how the scenario unfolded once the hypothesized
preparation had been released.
The group responsible for producing and releasing the
smallpox was deﬁned as a “Radical al-Qaida Splinter Group.” In
contrast, as best is known from the declassiﬁed documents and all
the other materials obtained by U.S. military forces in Afghanistan in
November and December 2001:
• No al-Qaida capacity for culturing viruses has ever been
identiﬁed.
• No al-Qaida group has yet been able to obtain a pathogenic
strain of anthrax.
• The group operating in Afghanistan in 2000-01 had
apparently not yet reached the stage of attempting to culture
vaccine strain anthrax. It had been provided with U.S. and
UK microbiological journal literature from the 1950s and
1960s. The “methods” sections of those papers would have
provided some aid for understanding culturing requirements
for anthrax. They would not have assured success in doing
it.
• Al-Qaida afﬁliated groups apparently either have not yet been
able to synthesize ricin, or have not yet attempted to do so.
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As indicated earlier, the “traces” of ricin reported as having
been found in London several years ago turned out to be false
positives. No ricin was found when the United States overran
the al-Qaida afﬁliated Ansar al-Islam camp in Northern Iraq
in March 2003.
The scenario posits that “Seed stocks of Variola major [smallpox] virus . . .
were obtained . . . from a bioweapons facility in the former Soviet Union.
This strongly implies that the “facility” suggested would be one
of the former premier institutes of the Soviet Biopreparat system,
Vector, located in Koltsovo near Novosibirsk, Russia. When the
Iranian government made overtures to Vector scientists in the years
around 1994, offering very generous payment to come and work
and/or teach in Iran, they failed to convince a single member of the
institute to come to Iran. These facilities are in better shape now than
they were 10 years ago, both in their ﬁnancial circumstances and in
their biosecurity arrangements. At a ﬁrst approximation, it therefore
seems highly unlikely that an al-Qaida afﬁliated group would be able
to obtain a smallpox sample from Vector. A U.S. Government ofﬁcial
with frequent contact with this facility thought that “the probability
was low.”157
The Atlantic Storm scenario attempts to prop up the basic
implausibility of this point in its assumptions by a gratuitous
“Intelligence Brieﬁng” which states that “information from U.S., UK,
French, and German intelligence” corroborated that the al-Qaida
group “has made contacts with former Soviet bioweaponeers.” If it
were the case that no less than four Western intelligence agencies
had been informed of the “contacts” by the al-Qaida group, it would
seem that there would have been a good chance to abort the activities
of the group. The scenario organizers point out that smallpox is also
assumed to be located in Russia in another institute besides Vector,
one belonging to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). That may very
well be the case, but if Vector has, to date, not been penetrated by
“terrorist” groups, it is still less likely that a Russian MOD facility
would be successfully penetrated.
The scenario posits that the al-Qaida group’s scientists received
microbiological training at Indian and U.S. universities. These
scientists received additional training when the group hired a
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scientist who was part of the former Soviet Union’s offensive
biological weapons program. This scientist taught the [al-Qaida
group] scientists how to grow a number of biological agents,
including variola major [smallpox], Bacillus anthracis, Ebola virus,
and Burkholderia mallei [glanders]. The terrorist group combined
this knowledge with publicly available technical information to
develop dry powder preparations of the viruses. Then, with their
own microbiology training, the terrorist group was able to acquire all
the required laboratory equipment to grow and process the Variola
major seed stock they had acquired into a relatively high-quality dry
powder that was then used in the attacks.
In the real world, Al-Qaida had one single individual who had
received a BS degree in Biology “with a clinical concentration” at
a U.S. college. He could in no way be described as a “scientist.”
Furthermore, he was arrested in December 2001. The individual
with more advanced training who supplied al-Qaida with its
microbiological literature was unwilling to himself do any laboratory
work for them. The few pieces of standard equipment obtained by
the group in Afghanistan were rudimentary in the extreme.
The USSR’s BW program and the organization of its relevant
institutes would make it extremely unlikely that a single former
Soviet BW scientist would know how to grow and work with both
Variola (smallpox) and Ebola viruses, as well as B. anthracis and B.
mallei bacteria. Even the Soviet virologists who worked with Ebola
and with Variola were in separate teams. Even more signiﬁcant,
growing the viruses in tissue culture requires knowledge of tissue
culture growth and maintenance. Soviet institutes such as Vector
had very sizable teams of specialists simply to do the tissue culture
preparations on which the viruses could grow. These individuals
would never have had experience growing B. anthracis or B. mallei.
In addition, not even the Soviet BW program succeeded in making a
dry-powder preparation of Ebola, the second virus that the scenario
includes.
When the former director of a Western national BW defense
laboratory was asked how long it would take a fully competent
professional group of experienced microbiologists who had never
before worked with viruses or tissue culture to successfully grow
Variola in tissue culture, he estimated 5 years. When asked how long
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he thought it would take a group of not very competent individuals
to do it, he estimated 10 years to never.158 Smallpox can also be grown
on the Chorio-allantoic membrane of fertilized chicken eggs. While
Soviet scientists grew vaccinia in eggs in their process of making
vaccine against smallpox, even that requires experience and careful,
tedious technical work.
In response to some of these criticisms of the Atlantic Storm
scenario, two of its principal creators, Colonel Randall Larsen and
Dr. Tara O’Toole have both invoked,
. . . a once-secret Defense Department experiment called Project Bacchus
[sic], which was conducted in the late 1990s to assess whether terrorists
could create a biological terror weapon using commercially available
equipment.
The project “demonstrated quite persuasively that about four people,
only one of whom had any biological training at all—and that was not
with the U.S weapons program; that was a degree in biology—could,
using materials bought through the Internet, set up shop, undiscovered,
and create a Bacillus anthracis look-alike,” O’Toole said.159

The statement is wrong on numerous grounds. First, the
description of the Biotechnology Activity Characterization by
Unconventional Signatures (BACUS) project that has been publicly
available and is repeated by O’Toole and Larsen is essentially
misleading.160 Its purpose was not to see “whether terrorists could
create” but to be certain that the experimental group did successfully
“create,” in order to see if detectable signatures would result that
could subsequently be used by U.S. forces in the ﬁeld hunting for
such sites. To that end, the group was composed of much more than
“about four people, only one of whom had any biological training at
all.” The on-site portion of the team was composed of 8-10 people,
many of whom had post-graduate degrees and experience. One held a
Ph.D. in microbiology from Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Another
had a masters degree in engineering, while another served in Special
Forces intelligence, and so on. The team had been speciﬁcally selected
so that all the aptitudes considered necessary to complete the project
successfully would be represented. They were to produce a harmless
bacterial anthrax simulant; no work with viruses or with any lethal
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pathogen comparable to smallpox was involved. In addition, this
on-site group was backed up by four or ﬁve highly experienced
biological weapons specialists acting as consultants, whose role it
was to oversee their work to be certain that no errors were made, to
the point of correcting a decimal place in a calculation.
In addition, the same group had gone through this exercise in an
earlier classiﬁed project named BITE SIZE. The two projects differed
primarily in their physical location—underground and above
ground—and the purpose of both projects was to serve as a test for
new detection methodologies. They were not experiments to see
“whether” the group could succeed. The claim that the experience
of the BACUS group proves the legitimacy of the Atlantic Storm
scenario is completely unsupportable.
Location of preparatory work by the al-Qaida splinter group:
The scenario describes the group’s laboratory as having been
“disguised as a small brewery in Klagenfurt, Austria.” With all
the years of claims that the production of biological agents could
take place “in breweries,” it would not be surprising if readers of the
extensive media coverage of the Atlantic Storm exercise might have
thought that the smallpox was being grown in the fermenting vats
of a brewery. For various technical reasons, that would be virtually
impossible. Viral bioreactors are, in contrast to brewery fermenting
vats, relatively small. The scenario, in fact, does not explain by which
method the group would have been able to produce its smallpox. It
says only “Smallpox virus can be grown in embryonated eggs and a
variety of tissue culture systems.” Work with viruses and cell culture
is very much more difﬁcult than growing bacterial cultures, and the
difﬁculties of cell culture for the putative group have been referred
to above. Embryonated chicken eggs must be special-ordered. The
suppliers are limited, and the customers are limited and usually
well-known to the suppliers. If the group ordered the thousands and
possibly tens of thousands of embryonated eggs and the egg incubators
that would be required for this method of growing smallpox virus,
local suppliers might wonder why an ostensible brewery needed
thousands of embryonated eggs, since only yeast, hops, and grain
would be ordered by a brewery. Suppliers therefore would be likely
to report such information to local authorities, offering another
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opportunity to abort the group’s activities. Operating breweries in
Austria are very highly regulated and routinely inspected. Even
construction of a brewery requires government licensing, design
approval and construction inspections. Applications for ownership
or operation are also regulated. Inspectors who would chance on
masses of incubating embryonated eggs would immediately be
alerted to the covert operation.161
The group would also have to prevent the escape of the grown
smallpox virus in liquid and solid waste efﬂuents. Incineration,
water sterilization and air-handling equipment are not normally
installed in “a small brewery.” These auxiliary systems alone are
relatively large, and the ability for them to be housed together with
the laboratory facilities “in a building as small as a 3-car garage,”
which the scenario suggests would be possible, is extremely unlikely.
More probably, it is impossible. These auxiliary systems must also
be custom-installed by specialists, and then tested. Depending on
how or where the smallpox vaccinations for the terrorist group were
obtained, that too could run the risk of being noted.
The Atlantic Storm scenario involved the distribution of a
dry-powder smallpox preparation from “a commercially available
dry powder dispenser” by vaccinated individuals in six different
cities (Istanbul, Frankfurt, Rotterdam, Warsaw, Los Angeles, and
New York City) over a span of 4 days. As regards preparation of the
smallpox powder, the scenario says only that “several sources for
information on methods” are available, and that “Variola virus can
be processed to a stable dried form just as vaccinia virus is dried to
make a vaccine.”
Such work was never carried out in the British government’s
BW program. Work with virus culture in the British program was
extremely rudimentary overall. It did advance further in the pre1969 U.S. BW program, but some years ago one of the individuals
involved in that work, Dr. William Patrick, offered the judgment
that “Only a state-sponsored group of terrorists with a lot of money
and connections would be able to acquire the smallpox virus and the
means for wielding it as a weapon.”162 The Atlantic Storm scenario
producers knew this quotation, since they have elsewhere used an
accompanying sentence by Patrick as a source.
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Speaking at a conference on April 22, 2005, after the details of
Atlantic Storm were known, Dr. Ken Alibek, the former Deputy
Director of the Soviet-era Biopreparat BW research and development
program, commented that he could “not understand why some
people make these scenarios using dry powder smallpox.” He
explained that “no one”—that is, the Soviet BW program—“wanted
to or could develop dry powder smallpox.”163 He gave two reasons
for that: ﬁrst, that the Soviet BW program had been able to develop
a preparation that kept smallpox stable in liquid; and second, that it
was much too dangerous for their own staff to prepare dry powder
smallpox preparations, even working in facilities with elaborate and
advanced containment systems. The claim in the Atlantic Storm
scenario that, nevertheless, this could have been achieved by a small
inexperienced group has absolutely no chance of being credible.
As for “Sources for Information” on methods, simply having them
on paper would certainly not be sufﬁcient, though it is the necessary
ﬁrst step. Even vaccinia is grown under conditions of containment,
but there is one critical difference: drying variola would have to be
carried out under extremely rigorous conditions of containment
of the opposite nature, that is, under negative air pressure, rather
than positive. The necessary air-handling equipment is sizable and
is not part of the infrastructure of a brewery. It is also not simply
purchasable from catalogues and, as indicated, would have to be
custom installed.
Elsewhere, Dr. Patrick has written,
A dry product with these [desired] properties requires serious
development with skilled personnel and sophisticated equipment. . . .
[While] Iraq successfully produced high quality liquids of anthrax and
botulinum toxin A in quantity, their efforts to weaponize their agents
were crude and far from successful. . . . By analogy, if a dedicated nation
such as Iraq had problems with agent delivery and dissemination, it
follows that terrorists would also experience these problems, and at a
higher level of intensity.164

Dispersal of the dry-powder preparation took place over a period
of several hours in each location. Does a “commercially available dry
powder dispenser” produce the particle size distribution required
for human aerosol infection? Is it battery-powered or gas cartridge57

powered to operate noiselessly? The device that the Aum Shinrikyo
group had made but never used in a Tokyo subway was designed to
distribute a liquid and would have worked for only a short period.
Spread of the smallpox epidemic. The Atlantic Storm scenario
uses rates of ﬁrst generation person-to-person transmission of 1:3, and
1:0.25 for second generation transmission. This is a major correction
from the value of 1:10 used by the same exercise sponsor in “Dark
Winter,” its previous smallpox exercise in June 2001. As recently as
the spring of 2004, a member of the University of Pittsburgh group
still defended the 1:10 estimate in a brieﬁng given in Washington,
DC.165
Adding anthrax production by the same “al-Qaida splinter
group,” presumably at the same brewery location. Several months
after the initial Atlantic Storm exercise, its creators were able to repeat
the exercise with 28 of the 34 members of the Homeland Security
Committee of the U.S. Congress. After replaying the Atlantic Storm
scenario (which followed a separate simulation of a terrorist attack
using a 10 kiloton nuclear device), this time yet another component
was added: “. . . [a] few days into the disaster, terrorists followed
up with anthrax attacks in major cities.”166 No other details were
provided. This adds an entire additional layer of implausibility
regarding the ability of an “al-Qaida splinter group” to produce
anthrax, the delivery of growth media to the “brewery,” and so on,
not to speak of the technical requirements of producing both anthrax
and dry-powder smallpox. Brewery fermenters are not useful for
growing anthrax, just as they are not useful for growing smallpox.
The individuals who played the roles of “World Leaders”
in the exercise. These took the roles of purely political ﬁgures,
presidents and prime ministers of their respective countries, except
for one who played the role of Director-General of the World Health
Organization (WHO). Of the 12 individuals, one had been the former
Director-General of WHO, and a second had been a Minister of
Health. Nevertheless, none had any experience with issues regarding
biological weapons. This point is mentioned only to note that none
apparently raised any questions regarding the basic plausibility of
the scenario. According to those responsible for the exercise, the
players were not even informed of the antecedent assumptions that
are being discussed here. Two members of a European advisory
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panel to the Atlantic Storm exercise recommended that it should
deal with an outbreak of pandemic ﬂu rather than smallpox, but the
suggestion was rejected. Had pandemic ﬂu been chosen, references
to a “radical al-Qaida splinter group,” invoking “bioterrorism,” and
so on would all have had to be discarded.
Media response. As best is known, not a single report of the
exercise raised any questions whatsoever regarding the plausibility
of the basic assumptions of the scenario.167 Dr. O’Toole, Director of
the Pittsburgh group that produced the exercise, stated that “The
scenario we posited is very conservative. . . . This could have been
much worse. The age of engineered biological weapons is here. It
is now.”168 Portions of the scenario once it was in play may have
been conservative; however, “engineered biological weapons” are
not relevant to an “al-Qaida splinter group,” and they are not “now”
in relation to “terrorist” groups. Dr. O’Toole has also claimed that
the scenario antecedents were made “as scientiﬁc as possible.” The
preceding discussion demonstrates that they were very far from
“scientiﬁc,” and were a combination of unrealistic and implausible
imaginings. A Washington Post editorial ended with another O’Toole
quote: “This is not science ﬁction. The age of Bioterror is now,”169
and an enthusiastic Washington Post columnist described the exercise
as an “eminently plausible scenario.”170 Rather, it was science ﬁction
because the scenario antecedents are not “now,” and they were not
in the least plausible.
Another Recent Example: Botulinum Toxin
and the U.S. Milk Supply.
Substantial controversy surrounded the recent publication of a
model study examining the consequences of the postulated addition
of botulinum toxin to the U.S. milk supply.171 Publication of the paper
in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) had
been delayed for a month due to a request by an ofﬁcial in the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). 172 During that
interval, the author, Dr. Lawrence Wein, released his conclusions in
a guest editorial in the New York Times. 173 Dr. Wein, a mathematical
modeler at the Stanford University School of Business, posited that “a
terrorist”—that is, a single individual—could produce, variously, a
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“few grams,” ten grams, or even as much as a kilogram of botulinum
toxin, “using a 28-page manual called ‘Preparation of Botulinum
Toxin’ that has been published on several jihadist websites, and
[could buy] toxin from an overseas black-market laboratory.” He
estimated that ten grams of the toxin might poison 568,000 people,
of whom as many as 60 percent might die.
It was possible to obtain a copy of the manual, which appeared to
be composed of the linked reproductions of the methods sections of
several journal papers. The manual did not explain how to obtain “a
producer strain” of clostridium botulinum in the ﬁrst place, other than
suggesting trial and error from sources in the wild. There are seven
serotypes of C. botulinum, each containing around 100 strains. Many
strains of C. botulinum produce no toxin at all, or very little. It took the
pre-1969 U.S. biological weapons program many man-years of work
by competent professionals to ﬁnd a reliable toxin producing strain.
The manual required the use of a walk-in cold room, a refrigerated
vacuum centrifuge, highly speciﬁc reagents, etc. None of these, as
well as many other necessary components, would likely be found in
“jihadist” camps. More importantly, having the manual, or having
the books or journals from which it is derived, does not confer on
anyone the ability to make botulinum toxin. That requires knowledge
and experience, and it is not the simplest procedure. Producing ten
grams would be a feat even for an experienced professional. It is
useful to remember that the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group, with no
constraints on funds for purchasing equipment and supplies, spent 3
to 4 years attempting to produce botulinum toxin and failed. It is now
known that the Aum had never even been able to obtain a culture of
the organism to work with. The author of the model introduced “an
overseas black market” as an obvious deus machina to evade these
difﬁculties, but no international black market for botulinum toxin is
known to exist. The author also appeared to be unacquainted with
the journal literature regarding the puriﬁcation of Botulinum toxin,
which would indicate what some of the difﬁculties are.
The author admitted in the PNAS paper that three variables in
his model “each contain several orders of magnitude of uncertainty.”
They appear to each contain at least three orders of magnitude of
uncertainty. Cumulatively, the author’s calculations could therefore
be off by as much as nine orders of magnitude—a billion times—
60

which could mean that not a single person would be poisoned or
die. If a mathematical model is widely divergent in its assumptions
from reality, all the mathematics in the world will not improve the
accuracy of its predictions.
One of Dr. Wein’s two main recommendations was that the
milk industry increase the temperature and duration time for milk
pasteurization. Over a period of several years, the International Dairy
Foods Association (IDFA) had, in fact, already done this, developing
new procedures which result in 99 percent inactivation of any
botulinum toxin present. By mid-2004, the IDFA had recommended
to its afﬁliated milk distributors that such changes be instituted,
although there was no legal statute that required that the steps be
followed by all producers. Dr. Wein had learned of this in 2004 while
giving seminar presentations of his model, but it apparently did not
alter his calculations.174
Efforts to arrive at realistic assessments have frequently been
unwelcome. In 1998, D. A. Henderson wrote that:
Four points of view prevalent among national policy circles and the
academic community at various times have served to dismiss biological
terrorism as nothing more than a theoretical possibility. 1) Biological
weapons have so seldom been deployed that precedent would suggest
that they will not be used. 2) Their use is so morally repugnant that no one
would deign to use them. 3) The science of producing enough organisms
and dispersing them is so difﬁcult that it is within the reach of only the
most sophisticated laboratories. 4) Like the concept of a “nuclear winter,”
the potential destructiveness of bio-weapons is essentially unthinkable
and so to be dismissed.175

Henderson concluded that “Each of these arguments is without
validity.” Three of them certainly are: I have seen no one arguing the
ﬁrst, second, or fourth of these parodies. The closest approximation
to the second are those studies by terrorism experts that seek to
understand whether real terrorist groups might or might not consider
using BW in light of their political interests, the potential responses of
the publics whose support they seek, etc. Examples of such analyses
by Parachini, Schweitzer, Simon, and others, based entirely on years
of study of real international terrorist groups and not the result of
abstract speculation, were referred to earlier. Only the third “point
of view” which Henderson refers to, with some modiﬁcation, is at
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issue. More recently, Jill Dekker-Bellamy, Biodefense Consultant
to a new European defense policy interest group, the New Defense
Agenda, wrote:
We shouldn’t be stuck in the box debating the lack of sophistication
terrorists have yet employed; the feasibility question or which pathogen
they will use, be it in a material or weaponised form. Our focus instead
would be better placed considering the stated intent of terrorists to do
so and preventing and denying them access to all the means to conduct
their terror campaign. . . .
Much debate has gone into whether or not terrorists or states pose
the greatest threat in the use of disease as a weapon. These debates
over whether or not terrorists are capable of successfully conducting a
biological attack normally get bogged down in a number of areas related
either to acquisition, technical areas (i.e., feasibility/dispersal/capacity)
or areas related to kill ratios and casualty numbers as if this is the Geiger
counter of successful biological terrorism. This may be of interest in
ranking weapons of mass destruction but not necessarily in ranking a
successful bio-terror campaign. Contemporary threat assessments, even
more than 2 years ago, point to smaller groups as now being more likely
to succeed in a bio-terrorism event, utilizing a diversity of agents.176

The “contemporary threat assessments” referred to remained
unidentiﬁed, and no one is “stuck in [a] box” or “bogged down.”
The intellectual “know-nothingism” in the above comment is
palpable, and harks back to Brian Jenkins’ 1999 description of “fact
free analysis” in the area of bioterrorism assessment. There is no
incompatibility between seeking the best preventive measures and
having a moderately realistic threat assessment. A statement by
U.S. Department of State Anti-Terrorism Coordinator William Pope
that “Europe should expect biological, chemical, and radiological
terrorist attacks at any time” is an example of the inadequacy that
is so common in many cases.177 In contrast, one recent thorough
study carried out for the UN WMD (“Blix”) Commission rendered
a considered assessment without fear of getting into “boxes” or
“bogged down,” and without contrived scenarios carried out in a
show-business atmosphere.178
This brings us to some anticipation of the future. A very brief 2page statement released in November 2003 by the U.S. CIA titled “The
Darker Bioweapons Future” was limited to very general remarks:
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A panel of life science experts convened for the Strategic Assessments
Group by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that advances
in biotechnology, coupled with the difﬁculty in detecting nefarious
biological activity, have the potential to create a much more dangerous
biological warfare threat. The panel noted:
•

The effects of some of these engineered biological agents could be
worse than any disease known to man.

•

The genomic revolution is pushing biotechnology into an
explosive growth phase. Panelists asserted that the resulting wave
front of knowledge will evolve rapidly and be so broad, complex,
and widely available to the public that traditional intelligence
means could prove inadequate to deal with the threat from these
advanced biological weapons.

•

Detection of related activities, particularly the development
of novel bioengineered pathogens, will depend increasingly
on more speciﬁc human intelligence and, argued panelists,
will necessitate a closer—and perhaps qualitatively different—
working relationship between the intelligence and biological
sciences communities.

In the last several decades, the world has witnessed a knowledge
explosion in the life sciences based on an understanding of genes and
how they work. According to panel members, practical applications of
this new and burgeoning knowledge base will accelerate dramatically
and unpredictably.
Growing understanding of the complex biochemical pathways that
underlie life processes has the potential to enable a class of new, more
virulent biological agents engineered to attack distinct biochemical
pathways and elicit speciﬁc effects. The same science that may cure some
of our worst diseases could be used to create the world’s most frightening
weapons.
The know-how to develop some of these weapons already exists.179

Others have ﬁlled in what this may evolve into in future decades
in more detail. Papers by James Petro, et al., Robert Carlson, Raymond
Zilinskas, Aleksandr Rabodzey, and others are recent examples which
were published prior to the brief CIA item above.180 These projections
are not discussed further here. The purpose of this monograph
has been to present a current threat assessment of “Bioterrorism”
and what one may expect “in the near future.” Advanced genetic
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engineering capabilities are not likely to become available to realworld nonstate actor/terrorist groups in the near future. Judgments
based on the prevalence of genetic engineering competence in the
general academic molecular research community are still not useful
guides to terrorist capabilities. A classiﬁed U.S. Defense Intelligence
projection prepared in July 1999 looking ahead to 2020 presented
the following anticipation of developments in future national BW
programs:
An increasing number of countries with biological warfare programs will
be able to develop infectious agents such as anthrax and plague, as well
as toxins such as botulinum and ricin. . . . New types of agents, such
as modiﬁed infectious organisms, low-molecular weight physiologically
active substances that disrupt body function, and synthetic modiﬁed
toxins, are also in development.181

Given that this was written when the number of existing states with
offensive BW programs was still considered to be higher and that the
“new type of agents” referred to had all been available for decades,
this was a relatively low keyed assessment. Speaking in 2001, Dr.
Joshua Lederberg, probably the most highly qualiﬁed expert in this
ﬁeld, said “I don’t think we’re going to leapfrog to the second or
third generation without seeing some of the more primitive efforts
in the ﬁrst instance.”182 In response to a statement by an ofﬁcial of
the DHS in June 2005 that the Department had “developed a strategy
to address the potential for a bioengineered attack,” Dr. Richard
Ebright commented that “There is no—zero—current likelihood
that a terrorist organization would construct ‘bioengineered’ viral
pathogens, or would construct ‘bioengineered’ bacterial pathogens
other than antibiotic-resistant bacterial pathogens.”183
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PART V
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE U.S. BIODEFENSE PROGRAM
Until quite recently the massive U.S. post-9/11 biodefense buildup
has been discussed almost exclusively in terms of its presumed
necessity, the substantial improvements achieved in response
readiness, the successive increase of expenditure and broadening
programs, and urgings from various quarters for still further increases
in expenditure and expansion of programs. Certainly, some of this
was needed, and others have analyzed the efﬁcacy or performance of
various elements of U.S. biodefense expansion since 2001.184 However,
these programs should be justiﬁed on their intrinsic merits, and not
due to alleged “spin-off” beneﬁts for generic public health. “Spinoff” rationalizations for defense R&D expenditure historically have
been spurious. They were made for the U.S. BW program over 35
years ago as well. The suggested “spin off” can always be procured
for a fraction of the cost of whatever the larger parent program may
be, by direct, targeted investments.
There are, however, also costs. The ﬁrst of these is direct federal
expenditure. Dr. David Franz is fond of pointing out that in 1996
and 1997, after the three major BW disclosures—of the USSR’s
enormous covert and illegal BW program, the Iraqi BW program,
and the failed attempts of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group to
produce BW agents—U.S. biodefense expenditures were still in
the range of roughly $150 million per year. They increased to $414
million by FY 2001. It was estimated at $7.5 billion for 2005.185 Annual
civilian biodefense expenditure has risen more than 18-fold and has
accounted for over $22 billion in expenditure during the past 4 ﬁscal
years.186 The U.S. FY 2006 civilian biodefense budget adds another
$4.2 billion.187 The question, of course, is whether this degree of
expenditure is merited. That is where the threat assessment should
be the crucial determinant. Cumulative DoD biodefense expenditure
for the past 4 years is not available. The budget for the joint DoD
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CB defense program was $1.25 billion in FY 2004, $1.38 billion in FY
2005, and $1.6 billion in FY 2006.188
The paradox of this situation is that this change in U.S.
Government priorities is primarily due to the events of 9/11, which
had no relation whatsoever to the capability to produce biological
agents by terrorist groups. And as has already been indicated, the
signiﬁcance of the U.S. anthrax events in regard to the anticipation
of future events of the same nature carried out by terrorist groups is
also unclear. In carrying out the 9/11 aircraft attacks in the United
States, the al-Qaida organization certainly was able to demonstrate
its enterprise, ingenuity and organizational capabilities—as well as,
we now know, a modicum of luck and the failure of various existing
U.S. Governmental functions.189 At the same time, it demonstrated
that the group had not been spending the major portion of its time
and effort to develop biological weapons. As a preceding section of
this monograph indicates, as best is known, little regarding al-Qaida
and BW has changed since. It is very possible that the U.S. political
response and the congressional funding levels and programs that
followed, would have been substantially smaller if it were known
for certain that the Amerithrax anthrax had been prepared by a U.S.
professional, or had been diverted from stocks prepared within the
U.S. biodefense program. On the other hand, it undoubtedly would
also have led to greater oversight of the U.S. biodefense program.
Another predictable cost has been the impact on other U.S. publichealth programs and expenditures.190 Currently one-third of both the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) infectious disease budget and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) budget and more
than half of U.S. Government and corporate vaccine development is
relegated to biodefense, that is, it focuses on the “select agents,” those
pathogens that are considered most likely to be used as biological
weapon agents.191 Equally or more striking were tallies produced in
February and March 2005 of changes in the funding patterns of the
National Institutes for Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) at
NIH in the years between 1996 and 2000 compared to 2001 to 2004.
Grants for research on six bacterial pathogens on the select agent
list grew from 33 in the ﬁrst 4r-year period to 497 in the second.
Tabulations for research on viral pathogens were similar, except for
research on inﬂuenza. Grants for all other agents dropped between
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20 and 50 percent just between FY 1999 to 2001 and FY 2002 to
2004, including for tuberculosis and acquired immune deﬁciency
syndrome (AIDS).192 There has been a 30-fold increase in NIH-NIAID
biodefense expenditure since 2001. It now accounts for over 35
percent of the current NIH-NIAID budget, an amount greater than
for AIDS research and greater than for all other non-AIDS infectious
disease research.193 An extremely sharp attack on this shift in public
health priorities appeared in the American Journal of Public Health in
October 2004.194 At the end of May 2005, NIH announced a shift in
disbursement schedules for grants that would also lead to an earlier
termination than planned for grants for some research projects on
malaria, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases.195
In a May 2005 report on U.S. preparations for a pandemic ﬂu
outbreak, the U.S. GAO pointed out that “the Department of Health
and Human Services has not ﬁnalized planning for an inﬂuenza
pandemic. In 2000, GAO recommended that DHHS complete the
national plan for responding to an inﬂuenza pandemic, but the plan
has been in draft format since August 2004.”196 At the time of the
2000 report, GAO also took the DHHS to task for lack of progress
in developing a vaccine against H5N1 ﬂu.197 At his retirement on
December 3, 2004, DHHS Secretary Tommy Thompson cited
pandemic ﬂu as the greatest threat to be faced; yet the situation is
virtually the same today as it was in 2000. Washington policymakers
have had almost 9 years since the ﬁrst outbreak of avian ﬂu in 1997
to come to grips with the problem Instead, the focus has been on
“bioterrorism” and biodefense.
The U.S. CDC has offered one estimate of the consequences of a
“medium level” ﬂu pandemic outbreak in the United States “in the
absence of any control measures” (e.g., vaccination and drugs):
• 15 to 35 percent of the U.S. population infected;
• 20 to 47 million cases of illness;
• 18 to 42 million outpatient hospital visits;
• 89,000 to 207,000 deaths; and,
• “associated costs ranging from $71 billion to $167 billion.”198
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The estimate of mortality appears to be low, given that its lower
level is about the same as the upper level of ordinary annual U.S. ﬂu
mortality as shown in Figure 1 (page 5).
Nevertheless, even weeks after the above information was
presented to Congress, U.S. senators and congressmen, both Democrat
and Republican, were still focused on drumming up support for
further increases in Federal expenditures against “Bioterrorism” to
support “Bioshield II,” subsidies for medical countermeasures against
“select agents.”199 Only in November 2005 did the administration
ﬁnally announce a plan and accompanying recommendations for
expenditures to prepare for and to combat pandemic ﬂu.
Biodefense Research and the Biological Weapons Convention.
The third area of cost concerns biological weapons arms control.
This was treated to some degree in The Problem of Biological Weapons,200
and summarized in a subsequent paper by Jonathan Tucker.201
Tucker makes two major points. The ﬁrst concerns proliferation, and
it is that “The most serious risk associated with science-based threat
assessment is that the novel pathogens and information it generates
could leak out to rogue states and terrorists.”202 The risk may be less
a “leak” in the classic sense than simply the accelerated accretion of
relevant science and publications, and the substantial overall push
that the ﬁeld is now getting and which will continue in the coming
years. Both the Aum Shinrikyo and the al-Qaida groups went back
to look at professional literature of previous decades. It is the same
procedure that new or expanding state programs followed, whether
it was Russia in the 1950s and 1960s, or Iraq in the 1980s.
Tucker’s second main point is that the greatly increased
magnitude of the U.S. biodefense R&D program will promote a BW
arms race, and, at least on the part of others, perhaps not all of it
of a defensive nature. The same point was made by Dr. Malcolm
Dando in a submission to the British Parliament in February 2003.203
That arms race, at least in its initial stages, is more likely to be
with developments in our own BW research program than against
developments in the programs of other states or nonstate actors. This
is exactly the process that took place in the United States from the late
1950s to the mid-1970s regarding development of intercontinental
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ballistic missile (ICBM) re-entry vehicles (warheads) and ABM
systems. It was succinctly described by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner,
President John F. Kennedy’s “Science Adviser” (Special Assistant
for Science and Technology), who had been involved with policy
planning for these antagonistic weapon systems for years. It was a
process in which development in our own offensive and defensive
strategic nuclear missile systems fed off the certain knowledge of
developments in the other.204 The “intelligence” was much more
certain than guessing about what was going on in other nations’
analogous programs, and could always be assumed, or attributed,
to them. At times, such attribution was correct, and at times not,
but even in the former case, new technological developments in the
U.S. programs quite frequently were made well in advance of when
they appeared elsewhere. Overall, the outcome was the same as that
posited by Tucker: the stimulation of parallel programs in other
states. The same very likely will occur now. At the present time, one
can assume that a smaller replica of the U.S. biodefense program
is taking place in Russia, smaller because of the great disparity in
funding levels. Russia retains the personnel and facilities to build
on their own work dating from their accelerated 1973 to 1992 (or
longer) offensive program, as well as the ability to pick up from
developments in the United States and in the nonmilitary published
literature on the functioning of the human immune system, etc. In
some cases, the United States is currently funding research in Russia
that is BW applicable.205
The fourth cost also concerns arms control but is sufﬁciently
signiﬁcant and different to require separate consideration. It is the
question of whether the U.S. Government, because of the biodefense
R&D program, remains in compliance with the provisions of the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), speciﬁcally Article I.
Towards the end of 1999, U.S. Director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet had established a Non-Proliferation Advisory Group
(NAG) to advise the CIA on what kinds of research it should undertake
in order to better understand the problems that the agency faced
in learning about WMD proliferation and, if possible, hindering it.
In one of its meetings, NAG was given a brieﬁng on a particular
CIA BW-related project, code-named “CLEAR VISION.” It involved
the fabrication and testing of a model of a Soviet BW bomblet.206 It
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appears that the project was already underway since 1997. One of the
members of NAG was Dr. Joshua Lederberg, who has served as an
adviser and consultant for BW issues to U.S. Government agencies
for the past 4 decades. After hearing the brieﬁng, Dr. Lederberg
raised two considerations:
• that the project raised BWC compliance issues,
• that the project raised perceptual issues; that is, if the project
subsequently became publicly known, it would raise questions
in the view of observers as to whether the U.S. Government
was engaged in activities of an offensive BW character.
He therefore suggested that the CIA Director could not authorize
such a project on his own authority; it would have to be referred to the
ofﬁce of the President for consideration, and to undergo interagency
review.207 Another member of NAG offered a third consideration:
that if U.S. intelligence agencies discovered that another country
was carrying out such a project, it would be considered prima facie
evidence of the existence of an offensive BW program in that country.
The project was then referred to the National Security Council
(NSC) for review. It was nevertheless ultimately approved, over the
minority objections of the legal adviser in the U.S. Department of
State. It would be carried out at a classiﬁed level.208 As indicated, it
appears the project was already in process by the time the brieﬁng
was given, and before the NSC review took place, and that more than
one bomblet was actually produced in order to carry out different
tests at different sites. None of four such projects—CLEAR VISION,
BACUS, BITE SIZE, and JEFFERSON—were reported by the United
States in its annual Conﬁdence Building Measures submissions
under the terms of the BWC.209 The ongoing utilization of several
very large aerosol test chambers in U.S. biodefense projects was also
not reported.
In the spring of 2004, a brieﬁng which described the work
program planned for the prospective National Biodefense Analysis
and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), particularly for one of its
four sub-centers, the Biothreat Characterization Center (BTCC),
became available.210 It was proposed that studies be carried out
in 16 different subject areas, of which the following nine seemed
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particularly signiﬁcant: genetic engineering; susceptibility to current
therapeutics; host-range studies; environmental stability; aerosol
animal-model development; aerosol dynamics; novel packaging;
novel delivery of threat; bioregulators and immunomodulators;
and “Red Teaming,” that is, duplication of threat scenarios. In
addition, task areas for biothreat-agent (BTA) analysis and technicalthreat assessment were summarized as “Acquire, Grow, Modify,
Store, Stabilize, Package, and Disperse.” Classical, emerging, and
genetically engineered pathogens were to be characterized for their
BTA potential. Aerobiology, aerosol physics, and environmental
stability would be studied in wet-laboratory and computerlaboratory settings. “Computational modeling of feasibility,
methods, and scale of production” would be undertaken, and “Red
Team” operational scenarios and capabilities would be assessed.
BTA use and countermeasure effectiveness would be studied “across
the spectrum of potential attack scenarios” through “high-ﬁdelity
modeling and simulation.”
Article 1 of the Biological Weapons Convention states:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances
to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise, or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justiﬁcation
for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purpose.
(2) Weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such
agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conﬂict.

In order to assure that the activities of all U.S. Government entities
remained within the bounds of Article 1, on the ratiﬁcation of the
BWC in 1975 the White House issued the so-called “Scowcroft
Memorandum” on December 23, 1975.211
As an indication of both the ambiguity and confusion surrounding
the question of “offensive” and “defensive” biological weapons
relevant research, the following ofﬁcial U.S. policy statements are
important to note. A very brief U.S. DoD press statement on January 8,
2002, on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare Defense answers
the question, “Is the U.S. still developing biological weapons to use
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against our enemies?” The answer provided began: “As required by
executive order, the U.S. Government ceased all offensive biological
research in November 1969 . . .”212 However, the original 1969 U.S.
policy decision is worded rather differently. The operative paragraph
of National Security Decision Memorandum 35 of November 25,
1969, reads:
The United States bacteriological/biological programs will be conﬁned
to research and developments for defensive purposes (immunization,
safety measures, etc.). This does not preclude research into the offensive
aspects of bacteriological/biological agents necessary to determine what
defensive measures are required.213

The analytic study that supported the U.S. policy decision also
included a very important relevant paragraph. In response to the
question, “Should the U.S. maintain only a RDT&E program,” it
replied:
There are really two sub-issues here: (1) should the U.S. restrict its program
to RDT&E for defensive purposes only, or (2) should the U.S. conduct both
offensive and defensive RDT&E? While it is agreed that even RDT&E for
defensive purposes only would require some offensive R&D, it is also
agreed that there is a distinction between the two issues. A defensive
purposes only R&D program would emphasize basic and exploratory
research on all aspects of BW, warning devices, medical treatment, and
prophylaxis. RDT&E for offensive purposes would emphasize work on
mass production and weaponization and would include standardization
of new weapons and agents.214

At least through 1989, DoD considered studies which produced
more virulent pathogens, sought to stabilize them, or studied
dissemination methods, to be characteristic indicators of offensive
BW research, and explicitly prohibited by the BWC. This was stated
by Colonel David Huxsoll, then director of USAMRIID, in testimony
to the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in May 1989,
and clearly displayed in a diagrammatic schema attached to his
testimony. (See Figure 2, below.)215
In 1989, after court action requiring a programmatic review of its
Biological Defense Research Program, the United States recorded a
decision to continue the Program, stating that it “is in full compliance
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with the Biological Weapons convention” and “does not include the
development of any weapons, nor does it attempt to develop new
pathogenic organisms for any use.”216

Figure 2.
After learning of the contents of the NBACC brieﬁng described
above, three veteran observers of biological weapons issues authored
a memorandum entitled “Biodefense Crosses the Line.”217 The three
authors had no knowledge whatsoever of the 1999/Lederberg/CIANAG experience. The memorandum argued four points:
• That taken together, many of the activities itemized within
the NBACC/BTCC research program—most particularly the
“Store, Stabilize, Package, and Disperse” sequence and the
“Computational modeling of feasibility, methods, and scale
of production”—may constitute development in the guise of
threat assessment. Development is prohibited by the Biological
Weapons Convention.
• That they very likely would be interpreted that way by at least
some other states.
• That U.S. intelligence agencies would judge a BW research
program of this character and magnitude found in any other
state to be an offensive BW program.
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• That the program would stimulate analogous efforts in other
states; in other words, the BW arms race that Tucker and
Dando warned against.
Individuals within the current administration have agreed with the
third point in conversations among themselves.218
The response to this critique of the NBACC/BTCC research
program by an ofﬁcial of the DHS in 2005 was a barely qualiﬁed selfincriminatory admission of the charge:
Homeland Security ofﬁcials defend the biodefense program, saying that it
will be as open as possible and will not breach the biowarfare agreement.
But they concede that biodefense today, by necessity, requires stretching
research boundaries beyond what would have been acceptable before the
anthrax attacks. “If you have a bad guy who is trying to hurt you with
a bioweapon, you have to understand how much material it will take
to do harm, what kinds of packages he’ll use to keep it stable, how he
might deliver it, and how effective it will be,” says Maureen McCarthy,
director of the Ofﬁce of Research and Development in the Homeland
Security Department’s science and technology division. “Those are hard
questions. You can’t answer them in a vacuum.”219

There is no “vacuum;” Article 1 of the BWC ﬁlls that space. And one
cannot “stretch” international treaties to which one is a state party. A
recent report on NBACC prepared for Congress by the Congressional
Research Service unfortunately includes no discussion of these
issues.220
On April 28, 2004, at the conclusion of a year’s review, the Bush
administration disclosed details of the new National Biodefense
Directive.221 Among them, reportedly, was that “the U.S. intelligence
community is under orders to carry out studies examining the types
of genetically engineered ‘bugs’ terrorists could be working on to
mount an attack.”222 The intelligence community is not the place that
such research should be carried out, if it should be carried out at all.223
Biodefense is the mission, all or in part, of a sufﬁcient number of other
U.S. Government agencies and facilities, which are perfectly capable
of carrying out whatever tasks are necessary. These include:
USAMRIID (DoD)
Dugway (DoD)
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The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (DoD)
Naval Medical Research Institute (DoD)
DARPA (DoD)
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) (DoD)
DTRA (DoD)
Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories
Department of Agriculture
Environmental Protection Agency
and now, even the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
The CIA can obtain any information regarding biological agents that
it needs in order to carry out its legitimate activities in the sphere of
U.S. national security from these other U.S. agencies or organizations.
Placing molecular genetics research under the jurisdiction of the
intelligence community guarantees that there will be no independent
oversight of it.
In the last year or two, there have been a series of major national
and international reports that have identiﬁed lines of “dual use”
molecular genetics research which are particularly problematical.
In essence that means that they could be misused to develop more
advanced biological weapons. Each of these reports suggests that such
lines of research should be subject to particular and special formal
oversight by one or another mechanism, much more oversight than
presently exists anywhere. Although none of these explicitly engage
the question of BWC treaty compliance, it is interesting to match the
nine NBACC program elements quoted earlier with the research
groupings in these reports. Two German researchers, Nixdorff and
Bender, were the ﬁrst to produce a short compilation. In discussing
“modiﬁcations of microorganisms that might have signiﬁcance for
bioweapons, [they] identiﬁed four classes of microbial manipulations
that have been the subject of intense debate within and outside
the scientiﬁc community: 1. The transfer of antibiotic resistance
to microorganisms; 2. Modiﬁcation of the antigenic properties of
microorganisms; 3. Modiﬁcation of the stability of microorganisms
to the environment; and 4. The transfer of pathogenic properties to
microorganisms.”224
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A few months later, DoD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency
convened a workshop to consider possible limitations on the
publication of scientiﬁc research that “could be misused for biological
warfare or terrorism.” It considered research that aims to achieve
one or more of six weaponization-related goals.
• Enhance pathogen infectivity, pathogenicity, antibiotic
resistance, or resistance of host immunological defenses.
• Improve the ability of a microbial pathogen to remain viable
and virulent during prolonged storage and/or after release
into the environment.
• Facilitate the dissemination of biological agents as a ﬁneparticle aerosol.
• Facilitate the dissemination of a biological agent by
contamination of food or water sources.
• Create a novel pathogen or one with characteristics that have
been altered to evade current detection methods or host
immune defenses.
• Assemble oligonucleotides to synthesize the genome of a
pathogenic microorganism.225
The third compilation appeared in a 2004 report prepared by a
Committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. The Committee
identiﬁed seven classes of experiments that it believes illustrate
the types of endeavors or discoveries that will require review and
discussion by informed members of the scientiﬁc and medical
community before they are undertaken or, if carried out, before they
are published in full detail. They include experiments that:
• Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective.
• Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics
or antiviral agents.
• Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a
nonpathogen virulent.
• Would increase transmissibility of a pathogen.
• Would alter the host range of a pathogen.
• Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection
modalities.
• Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or
toxin.226
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In December 2004, a report of WHO included a relatively similar
group of six:
• Facilitate the production of toxins that were previously
difﬁcult to acquire on a large scale;
• Make a pathogen resistant to the immune system or to
antibiotic treatment, hence rendering defensive measures in
effective;
• Modify the environmental stability of a pathogen;
• Create bacteria and viruses of greater virulence or render
previously harmless organisms pathogenic;
• Change host speciﬁcity of microorganisms; or,
• Render the identiﬁcation and detection of engineered
pathogens very difﬁcult (e.g., to bypass the current detection
technologies).227
A ﬁfth group of experimental categories were elaborated under
a University of Maryland project aimed at designing a national
and international mechanism for oversight of such work. It divides
projects that would be considered “dangerous” into three groupings:
extremely, moderately and potentially dangerous. (See Table 3
below.)
The overlap between the nine NBACC program elements quoted
earlier and all of these ﬁve lists is obvious.
On April 18, 2005, the DHS proposed to categorize the NBACC
facility as a Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC).228 Historically, a very large portion of the work carried out
at FFRDCs, such as the Lincoln Laboratories, the Mitre Corporation,
the Center for Naval Analysis, the Institute for Defense Analysis, the
three U.S. Department of Energy laboratories (Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia National
Laboratory), the RAND Corporation (Air Force), and others is
classiﬁed. As of 2005, there are 37 FFRDCs altogether. In the words of
a May 2005 Congressional Research Service report, “Many FFRDCs
conduct research principally in classiﬁed ﬁelds for the Defense and
Intelligence Communities.”229 Whether the transformation of NBACC
into a FFRDC will make oversight of its work signiﬁcantly more
difﬁcult than it would otherwise have been in any case, no one can
say, but it probably can be assumed that it will. It is almost certain
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Extremely Dangerous Activities (EDA):
• Work with eradicated agent
• Work with agent requiring Biosafety Level-4
• De novo synthesis of above
• Expanding host range of disease agent to new host (in humans, other animals
and plants) or changing the tissue range of a listed agent
• Construction of antibiotic- or vaccine-resistant listed agent
Moderately Dangerous Activities (MDA):
• Increasing virulence of listed agent or related agent
• Insertion of host genes into listed agent or related agent
• Increasing transmissibility or environmental stability of listed agent or related agent
• Powder or aerosol production of listed agent or related agent
• Powder or aerosol dispersal of listed agent or related agent
• De novo synthesis of listed agent or related agent
• Construction of antibiotic- or vaccine-resistant related agent
• Genome transfer, genome replacement, or cellular reconstitution of listed agent
or related agent
Potentially Dangerous Activities (PDA):
• Work with listed agent—or exempt avirulent, attenuated, or vaccine strain of select
agent—not covered by EDA/MDA
• Increasing virulence of nonlisted agent
• Increasing transmissibility or environmental stability of nonlisted agent
• Powder or aerosol production of nonlisted agent
• Powder or aerosol dispersal of nonlisted agent
• De novo synthesis of nonlisted agent
• Genome transfer, genome replacement, or cellular reconstitution of nonlisted agent
Deﬁnitions
Agent: fungus, protist, rickettsia, bacterium, virus, viroid, or prion; or genetic element,
recombinant nucleic acid, or recombinant organism.
Listed agent: agent on CDC Select Agent list, USDA High-Consequence Livestock
Pathogens list, or USDA/APHIS/PPQ Plant Pathogens list.
Related agent: for fungi, protists, rickettsiae, or bacteria, an agent in the same genus
as a listed agent; for viruses, viroids, or prions, an agent in the same family as a listed
agent; for genetic elements, recombinant nucleic acids, or recombinant organisms, an
agent orthologous to a listed agent. (This category includes any avirulent, attenuated,
or vaccine strain of a listed agent, if said strain is exempt under the CDC Select Agent
list, USDA High-Consequence Livestock Pathogens list, or USDA/APHIS/PPQ Plant
Pathogens list.)
Non-listed agent: agent other than a listed agent or related agent.
Antibiotic: antibiotic of therapeutic utility against listed agent.
Vaccine: vaccine of therapeutic utility against listed agent.
Powder: powder other than lyophilized reference specimen (<10 mg.)

Table 3. Groupings.230
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that all of the “threat assessment” research that it will undertake will
be classiﬁed.231 NBACC’s initial building cost is currently estimated
at $128 million. In addition to NBACC, the DHS has now announced
plans to build a National Bio and Agrodefense Facility (NBAF) at
an initial projected building cost of $451 million. It would feature
large animal BL-3 and BL-4 research capability in order to work with
foreign animal diseases. The insertion of the NBAF into the DHS
budget proposal was made by senior administration ofﬁcials. In
May 2005, the Army proposed a $1 billion expansion to USAMRIID
to be built at the National Interagency Biodefense Campus at Fort
Detrick, Maryland.232 With inevitable cost overruns by the time
these three new facilities will all be completed, the infrastructure
investment for them will very likely exceed $2 billion. In addition,
the U.S. Department of Agriculture is modernizing the National
Animal Disease Center in Ames, Iowa, at a cost of an additional $406
million.233
A new element, at least as problematic if not more so than the
NBACC research program alone but certainly associated with it, is
the newly announced wording by the DHS on the programmatic
mission of NBACC. It clearly moves U.S. Government policy in
the same—wrong—direction. The NBACC research program does
so by implication; this does so in a more formal way. The DHS
has apparently adopted and begun to publicly use its own novel
interpretation of the provisions of Article 1 of the Biological Weapons
Convention. In the FY 2006 Congressional Justiﬁcation for DHS, the
DHS wrote the following in discussing NBACC:
The work in these laboratories will be for defensive purposes only. The
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,
also known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC),
prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and acquisition of
offensive biological weapons. The U.S. is a signatory to this treaty, and
all activities performed at the NBACC Facility will comply with this
treaty and with all other applicable laws. [Emphasis added.]234

The insertion of the single word “offensive” in front of “biological
weapons” is a direct contradiction of all the rest of the statement and
of all existing international legal interpretations of Article 1 of the
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BWC. It implies that the BWC does not prohibit the development,
production, and stockpiling of “defensive” biological weapons. But,
the Biological Weapons Convention does not distinguish between
“offensive” biological weapons, and any other kind. There is no such
thing as “defensive” biological weapons. Whatever military doctrine
may say regarding distinctions between offensive and defensive
conventional weapons, this does not apply to biological weapons.
Article 1.1 of the Biological Weapons Convention (see page 71) allows
the growth of laboratory quantities of pathogens (agents) for defensive
purposes, that is, in order to develop vaccines and pharmaceuticals,
test rapid detection systems, masks, decontamination systems and so
on. However even the “development” of the pathogen is explicitly
forbidden – “never in any circumstances” – as is production and
stockpiling. Article 1.2 is a blanket prohibition on the development
and production of “weapons, equipment, or means of delivery
designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed
conﬂict.” The three qualifying words in Article 1.1 – prophylactic,
protective, and peaceful – which operationally deﬁne “defensive”
in the treaty do not apply to “weapons, equipment, or means of
delivery” in Article 1.2.
DHS’s choice of language in its FY2006 budget request was not
an accident, but a deliberate, considered decision.235 The new DHS
BWC treaty interpretation ﬁrst appeared in the September 17,
2004, DHS submission for comments on the Draft Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) for NBACC, and was repeated in the ﬁnal
EIS released by DHS on December 23, 2004. In between the two
submissions the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
in Washington, DC had questioned the DHS treaty interpretation,
pointing out that in the 1989 Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement for the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program
(CBDP), DoD states that the Biological Weapons Convention “makes
the clear distinction between defensive and offensive efforts by
identifying the development of biological weapons delivery systems
as a discrete and prohibited activity.” In addition, U.S. statutory
law, the 1989 implementing legislation for the Biological Weapons
Convention [18U.S Code 175] makes no distinction between
“offensive” and “defensive” biological weapons. DHS responded to
these points by stating in its ﬁnal EIS that “the DoD’s programmatic
80

NEPA documentation cited has been superseded.” (NEPA refers
to the National Environmental Policy Act, under which federal
agencies are required to provide Environmental Impact Statements.)
In essence, the formal DHS response in this instance was the same as
the informal comment by DHS’s Maureen McArthy quoted earlier:
that the times had changed. The DHS phrase about “superseded”
brashly presumes to revoke the DoD legal commitments made in
1989, and the interpretation of Article 1 of the BWC that the U.S.
Government presumably held between 1972 and certainly at least
until 1989, and as best as anyone knows until 2004. The times may
very well have changed, but the provisions of the Biological Weapons
Convention have not, and under international law, they are not open
to being changed by unilateral interpretations.
An analogous situation occurred some 20 years ago involving
another arms control treaty. In the mid-1980s the Reagan
administration attempted to reinterpret one of the provisions of
the ABM Treaty through a memorandum—the so-called “Sofaer
amendment”—written by Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the
Department of State. It blandly stated that the United States could
carry out a particular category of ABM testing which the ABM Treaty
forbade. In that instance, the U.S. Senate took objection, stating that
since it was the duty of the Senate to ratify international treaties,
the Ofﬁce of the President had no authority to modify the terms of
the treaty once it had been ratiﬁed. Extensive Senate Hearings were
held, and books and monographs were written on the subject.236
The USSR, the treaty cosignatory with the United States, also stated
that it would not accept the suggested modiﬁcation or the activities,
and that the integrity of other U.S.-USSR strategic arms limitation
agreements would be placed in jeopardy if the United States
unilaterally began the testing that it proposed to do. The Reagan
administration ultimately withdrew its proposed unilateral treaty
modiﬁcation.
These issues have certainly come to the attention of working
level ofﬁcials in the Foreign Ministries of at least some countries
closely allied with the United States, but it is not known whether it
has become a matter of private diplomatic discussion between those
countries and the United States. Probably not. The subject has not
been broached publicly.
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The entire area of oversight of problematical “dual use” research
in molecular genetics and its applications in the United States appears
to range from inadequate at local levels to virtually nonexistent at
the national level and in terms of BWC treaty compliance.
In the late 1970s, the NIH established a system applicable to any
institution within the United States or overseas that receives any
support from NIH for recombinant DNA research. That system
required every such institution to establish an Institutional Biosafety
Committee (IBC), and to register that IBC with the NIH Ofﬁce of
Biotechnology Activities. The IBCs were then to oversee projects
within their own institutions following a common set of guidelines
and criteria. Failure to adhere to the NIH guidelines could result
in the suspension, limitation, or termination of NIH funding for
recombinant research. However, this system does not apply except
on a voluntary basis to a very large population of institutions that
are not recipients of NIH funding, such U.S. Government biodefense
laboratories and U.S. Government contractors, as well as hundreds
of commercial biotechnology enterprises. For example, the Battelle
Memorial Institute, a government contractor which has been carrying
out Project Jefferson at least since 2001, the development of a vaccine
resistant strain of anthrax to duplicate Soviet-era work, apparently
has no functioning IBC, although the research is by deﬁnition
recombinant DNA work.237 The Departments of Energy, Defense,
and Agriculture have numerous facilities carrying out recombinant
DNA research at the same time as they have no NIH-registered IBCs.
No one knows how much biodefense and bioterrorism research falls
entirely outside the NIH guidelines and the IBC system. In addition,
a recent study demonstrated that a very large proportion of the IBCs
operated in haphazard fashion or not at all.238 Some three dozen
commercial entities that do receive NIH funding for biodefense
research had no IBC registered with the NIH at all. Finally, the
existing NIH guidelines do not currently include consideration of
the security or proliferation implications of dual-use research, and it
is for that reason that the National Academy of Sciences committee
recommended that the seven categories of experiments of concern be
added to the NIH oversight process.
In response to the recommendations of the NAS committee
report, the administration announced the establishment of a National
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Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) on March 4, 2004.
Its mandate was to last for 2 years. The NSABB was established by
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and is to
be housed within the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The staff
of the NSABB was not appointed until 11 months later in February
2005. No announcement of the membership of the Board was made
until its ﬁrst meeting on June 30, 2005. The responsibilities of the
NSABB obviously were not seen as a signiﬁcant priority by the
administration. A May 30, 2005, announcement stated that “The
Board is charged with advising on the development of: guidelines
for the oversight of dual-use research; national policies governing
the publication and communication of sensitive research results
. . .”239 The apparent notion was that the NSABB would oversee a
process by which the National Academy committee’s suggestions
regarding experiments of “dual use” concern would be grafted on to
the IBC system. The NSABB will not itself review individual research
project protocols; it will only respond to requests for guidance. That
the local institutional committees would perform this much more
substantive task, given their highly problematic record mentioned
above in dealing with much less demanding considerations, seems
dubious at best.240 A very similar opinion was expressed by the
chairmen of six IBCs at major universities in the southeastern United
States.241 But most importantly, the NSABB is to have no oversight
over classiﬁed BW-relevant research, which is the location in which
the most problematical dual-use research is likely to take place.
As an example of the contradictory and counterproductive nature
of even current NIH funding decisions, the NIAID at NIH recently
announced a grant for a researcher hoping to develop a method of
countering the action of botulinum toxin. The grant recipient, Dr. Kim
Janda, noted that the task would be difﬁcult because “the neurotoxin
[is] quite unstable.” He would therefore be “collaborating with
scientists in Wisconsin to develop a more stable form of the neurotoxin,
one that is more easily studied.”242 The biological weapon programs
of both the United States and the USSR discovered, independently,
that botulinum toxin was not a very useful biological weapon because
the toxin becomes unstable with increased puriﬁcation. Here was
an NIH research award whose purpose was announced as “aimed
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at stopping bioterrorism weapons” that was proposing to develop
“a more stable form of the toxin” in order to carry out its research.
However, that means preparing a much more effective botulinum
toxin than had been available before, which had evaded preparation
by the two largest offensive biological weapons programs in history,
except in very small quantities.243
Another example is the proposal that,
Better developed animal models and studies of the aerobiological
properties of ﬁloviruses [Ebola and Marburg virus] need to be conducted—
which are critical to evaluating the threat posed by ﬁloviruses. . . .
Without data, there can be little understanding of the level of threat
that ﬁloviruses present. For example, it is not clear from the available
data whether ﬁloviruses would cause large-scale infections and deaths
if disseminated by aerosol over a city without extensive preparation or
modiﬁcation (“weaponization”).244

This is a perfect example of research designed to probe a potential
vulnerability, threat assessment in the absence of a veriﬁed threat.
As the authors clearly state in their paper, ﬁlovirus infection in
nature does not occur via aerosol. The research therefore breaks new
ground, and innumerable examples could be proposed all of which
would, in effect, be pushing into areas that may not be justiﬁable.
It is clear that at the time of the three classiﬁed biodefense projects
in the 1999-2001 time period, there was no U.S. Government-wide
NSC-interagency process to review the compatibility of all elements
of the U.S. biodefense program with Article I of the BWC. Six years
later, there still is none. Even existing mandated treaty compliance
frameworks, such as within the U.S. DoD, to carry out reviews of
BW R&D projects did not function in the case of its own classiﬁed
project in 1999-2001. DoD Directive Number 2060.1 mandated the
establishment of DoD Compliance Review Groups (CRGs).245 An
analogous directive existed in years prior to 2001. No CRG review
of the DoD project (BACUS) ever took place.246 Whether one took
place within the DIA, whose project it was, is unknown. Nor was
information about the project ever brought to the attention of the
National Security Council (NSC).
There is no functioning overall U.S. Government compliance
oversight process today for research that impacts the BWC. DoD
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continues to oppose the formation of such an NSC-level treaty
compliance process.247 Others have suggested that a U.S. BWC
compliance review process should be located in the National Academy
of Sciences. That may additionally be desirable as a backstop, but
it is a government function, and it belongs at the NSC level. With
a second heavyweight Cabinet department, Homeland Security,
reinterpreting the most critical provisions of the BWC, presumably
to permit research that was heretofore considered out of bounds, the
picture becomes problematical and dangerous.
The cost of a U.S. BW research program that may cross into
“development,” and of potential U.S. noncompliance with the BWC,
very simply means the weakening of the BWC and the international
regime that stands in the way of the proliferation of BW to new states
or to nonstate actors/terrorist groups. That is certainly not something
that anyone who wants such proliferation halted and reversed can
possibly want to happen. On May 2, 2005, the U.S. Department of
State released a Fact Sheet on “United States Initiatives to Prevent
Proliferation.” It described seven unquestionably desirable U.S.
Government programs. It did not, however, so much as mention
any of the international nonproliferation treaty regimes: the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or
the Biological Weapon Convention. This emphasis was repeated
at the end of May in statements by President George W. Bush and
Secretary of State Condolezza Rice on the occasion of the second
anniversary of the U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative. The current
U.S. administration does not show much sympathy for international
regimes.
It is sometimes said that criticism of the United States and its
policies in regard to the BWC itself weakens the Convention, and
serves to give other nations that may have no interest at all in
observing its provisions a cover for their own misbehavior. There
appears to be no way to address major issues without introducing
such risk. Caution and reconsideration only rarely take place within
the government, and if the trend appears to be a deteriorating one,
the issues have to be raised publicly. Unfortunately, the United States
also loses a portion of its leverage to raise questions about possible
questionable activities in other states.
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PART VI
CONCLUSION
A summary of the material presented in this monograph produces the following conclusions:
• Signiﬁcance of the problem. “Bioterrorism” may or may not
develop into a serious concern in the future, but it is not “one
of the most pressing problems that we have on the planet
today.”
• The evolution of state biological weapons programs. The
number of state BW programs has apparently been reduced
by one-third or one-fourth in the past 15 years. The remaining
number of countries appears to be stable; no compensating
rise in offensive state BW programs has been identiﬁed. In
addition, the U.S. Government—which has almost without
exception in past decades been the only country to publicly
identify WMD proliferants—appears in its most recent
statements to be qualifying the status of states with presumed
offensive BW programs. To date, no state is known to have
assisted any nonstate or terrorist group to obtain biological
weapons.
• The evolution of nonstate/terrorist biological weapon
capabilities. The production and distribution of a dry powder
anthrax product in the United States in 2001 is the most
signiﬁcant event. However, understanding to what degree
that demonstration of competence is relevant to “traditional”
terrorist groups is impossible until the perpetrator(s) of the
anthrax events are identiﬁed. If it was done with assistance,
materials, knowledge, access, etc., derived from the U.S.
biodefense program, the implications change entirely.
The Rajneesh group (1984) succeeded in culturing
Salmonella. The Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group failed to
obtain, produce, or disperse anthrax and botulinum toxin.
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The steps taken by the al-Qaida group in efforts to develop
a BW program were more advanced than the United
States understood prior to its occupation of Afghanistan in
November-December 2001. Nevertheless, publicly available
information, including the somewhat ambiguous details that
appeared in the March 31, 2005, report of the Commission
on Intelligence Capabilities, indicates that the group failed
to obtain and work with pathogens. Should additional
information become available regarding the extent to which
the al-Qaida BW effort had progressed, that assessment might
have to be changed.
Scenarios for national BW exercises that posit various
BW agents in advanced states of preparation in the hands
of terrorist groups simply disregard the requirements in
knowledge and practice that such groups would need in
order to work with pathogens. Unfortunately, 10 years
of widely broadcast public discussion has provided such
groups, at least on a general level, with suggestions as to what
paths to follow. If and when a nonstate terrorist group does
successfully reach the stage of working with pathogens, there
is every reason to believe that it will involve classical agents,
without any molecular genetic modiﬁcations. Preparing a dry
powder preparation is likely to prove difﬁcult, and dispersion
to produce mass casualties equally so. Making predictions on
the basis of what competent professionals may ﬁnd “easy to
do” has been a common error and continues to be so. The
utilization of molecular genetic technology by such groups is
still further off in time. No serious military threat assessment
imputes to opponents capabilities that they do not have. There
is no justiﬁcation for imputing to real world terrorist groups
capabilities in the biological sciences that they do not posess.
• Framing “the threat” and setting the agenda of public
perceptions and policy prescriptions. For the past decade the
risk and immanence of the use of biological agents by nonstate
actors/terrorist organizations—“bioterrorism”—has been
systematically and deliberately exaggerated. It became more
so after the combination of the 9/11 events and the OctoberNovember 2001 anthrax distribution in the United States that
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followed immediately afterwards. U.S. Government ofﬁcials
worked hard to spread their view to other countries. An ediﬁce
of institutes, programs, conferences, and publicists has grown
up which continue the exaggeration and scare-mongering.
In the last year or two, the drumbeat had picked up. It may
however become moderated by the more realistic assessment
of the likelihood of the onset of a natural ﬂu pandemic, and the
accompanying realization that the U.S. Government has been
using the overwhelming proportion of its relevant resources
to prepare for the wrong contingency.
Others see exaggeration as necessary in order to prompt
preparation. They acknowledge the exaggeration but argue
that political action, the expenditure of public funds for
bioterrorism prevention and response programs, will not
occur without it. “Bioterrorism” may come someday if
societies survive all their other impending crises. However,
the persistent exaggeration is not benign: it is almost certainly
the single greatest factor in provoking interest in BW among
terrorist groups, to the degree that it currently exists, for
example, in the al-Qaida organization. Precisely this occurred:
Their most senior leadership was provoked by statements
regarding bioterrorism and its supposed ease by U.S. ofﬁcials
in 1996-97.
• Costs of the U.S. biodefense program. On the grounds of
“necessity,” the U.S. biodefense research program appears to
be drifting into violation of Article 1 of the BWC. There is little
question but that U.S. ofﬁcials would make that judgment of
any other nation’s biodefense program in which the same
kind of work was being carried out as is taking place and is
planned by U.S. agencies, or in the case that agencies of another
government put forward reinterpretations of the provisions
of Article 1 of the BWC so as to imply that work could be
done on “defensive” biological weapons. A national-level
oversight system to see that BWC compliance is maintained
by all projects of the U.S. biodefense program—unclassiﬁed,
classiﬁed, and perhaps yet other “black” projects—does not
exist. Should the BWC be weakened further and if other state
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programs begin to go down the same research path as the
U.S. biodefense program, together with any eventual
recourse to BW by nonstate actors, the international regime
against the development of biological weapons may be
irrevocably damaged.
Policy Recommendations.
The policy recommendations derive directly from the
analysis presented in the study, and fall into two groups: 1)
threat assessment, and 2) U.S. biodefense program oversight.
Recommendation 1: A thorough national BW threat
assessment is necessary, to the degree that the best available
information permits. It should be based on the realities of
state and nonstate actor capabilities, rather than on
hypothetical projections of technological state-of-the-art.
Recommendation 2: Government officials should avoid,
and where necessary correct, exaggerated portrayals of the
biological weapons threat. Such exaggeration, even if seen as
politically useful by some, runs counter to the national
interest by stimulating the interest of others in BW
development.
Recommendation 3: Federal expenditures for Bioshield I
and II—to procure vaccines against BW “select agents”—
would very likely be of far greater benefit to the U.S. public
if they were redirected to procuring vaccines against
pandemic flu strains. Such reconsideration and redirection
should be an urgent executive and legislative priority.
Recommendation 4: The U.S. Government should make
every effort to strengthen the Biological Weapons
Convention, the international treaty regime whose essential
purpose it is to maintain the norm against the proliferation
of BW. It should do nothing to damage it or reduce its
stature or relevance.
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Recommendation 5: A serious national policy of
oversight for the U.S. biodefense research program is
necessary:
• Above all, oversight should exist at the level of the
National Security Council.
• The Department of Defense should see that its
relevant Compliance Review Group is functional.
• The Department of Homeland Security should
institute a similar group to monitor the compliance of
the work program of the National Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) with
the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.
• Authority to explicitly review international treaty
compliance of all programs carried out by NBACC
should additionally be extended to the Committee on
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures of the
National Research Council. Most desirable would be
an advisory group of the stature of the President’s
Science Advisory Council of the 1960s. Review panels
with members selected from in-house laboratories
and federal contractors are unlikely to provide a
critical review.
• The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity
(NSABB) should be provided with authorization to
include classified biodefense research programs
under its jurisdiction.
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